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The main objective of the thesis is to analyze how a small state copes with a shock to its 
security emanating from a conventional military threat. The author used a single case 
study and chose the case of Azerbaijan after the Tovuz clashes. The Tovuz incident was 
a shocking event for Azerbaijan since it created an imminent threat to the security of the 
state and its energy infrastructure. The study seeks to analyze shifts in Azerbaijan’s 
security strategy as a result of perceived threats from the Tovuz clashes. The thesis aims 
to identify whether there has been a fundamental change in Azerbaijan’s relations with 
regional powers and examine the overall implications of the Tovuz skirmishes on 
Azerbaijan’s foreign policy decisions. To accomplish the research aims, the author 
contextualized Baku’s reaction to the Tovuz clashes in the long-term trends of 
Azerbaijan’s security policy. The author refers to the neorealist perspective on the 
security strategy choices of small states. The qualitative interview with Azerbaijani 
experts was selected as a major data collection method. 
The study results identified a tactical shift to Turkey. There was a change in Azerbaijan’s 
rhetoric towards Russia after the Tovuz incident. The perception of an imminent threat as 
a result of the clashes and tensions with Moscow prompted Baku to further consolidate 
its military, political, and economic partnership with Ankara. The results of the study also 
determined that one of the major implications of the Tovuz skirmishes was the 
reconsideration of Baku’s stance on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
Although the military cooperation between Baku and Ankara has intensified after the 
clashes and there have been tensions in Baku-Moscow relations, the results of the study 
demonstrated that Azerbaijan’s security strategy did not fundamentally change. 




Table of Contents 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 8 
1. Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................... 11 
1.2. Balancing and Bandwagoning.................................................................................. 16 
1.3. Neutrality.................................................................................................................. 20 
1.4. Strategic Hedging ..................................................................................................... 23 
2. Methodology ............................................................................................................... 29 
2.1. Research design and the case selection .................................................................... 29 
2.2. Research methods and data collection ..................................................................... 29 
3. Azerbaijan’s security strategy since its independence ................................................ 32 
3.1. Azerbaijan’s security strategy during the Mutallibov and Elchibey presidencies: two 
opposite strategies ........................................................................................................... 32 
3.2. Azerbaijan’s security strategy during Heydar Aliyev’s presidency: the period of 
balanced foreign policy (October 1993-October 2003) .................................................. 39 
3.3. Azerbaijan’s security strategy during Ilham Aliyev’s presidency (2003-Present) .. 47 
4. The Tovuz Clashes: Prelude, Development and Reactions. ....................................... 59 
4.1. Azerbaijan’s perception of Armenia’s moves prior to the clashes .......................... 59 
4.2. Overview of the Tovuz skirmishes .......................................................................... 61 
4.3. Azerbaijan’s perception of the skirmishes and the international reaction ............... 63 
4.4. Tovuz skirmishes in the context of the geopolitical competition between Russia and 
Turkey ............................................................................................................................. 66 
5. Analysis of short-term consequences of the Tovuz clashes for Azerbaijan’s security 
policy ............................................................................................................................... 71 
5.1. Azerbaijani-Russian relations after the Tovuz skirmishes ....................................... 71 
5.2. Azerbaijani-Turkish relations after the Tovuz clashes............................................. 74 
5.3. Implications on the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict .............................. 80 
5.4. Implication of changes on Azerbaijan’s security strategy ....................................... 82 
6. Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 87 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 91 





List of Abbreviations 
APF- Azerbaijani Popular Front 
BTC- Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan  
BTE- Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum  
BTK- Baku-Tbilisi-Kars  
CIS- Commonwealth of Independent States 
CSTO- Collective Security Treaty Organization 
IPAP- Individual Partnership Action Plan 
OSCE- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
SGC- The Southern Gas Corridor  
















From July 12 to July 16 of 2020, there has been an armed confrontation between 
the military forces of Azerbaijan and Armenia. This was the largest clash between the 
two countries since the April war of 2016 and both parties blamed each other for the 
violation of the ceasefire. One of the most significant features of this clash was the fact 
that it was conducted not on the line of contact between Azerbaijan and the unrecognized 
“Nagorno-Karabakh Republic”, but directly on the border between Azerbaijan and 
Armenia. Tovuz district of Azerbaijan is located far away from Nagorno-Karabakh, on 
the strategic corridor linking Azerbaijan with Georgia. This corridor has utmost 
importance to Azerbaijan due to the fact that all the vital routes and energy projects of 
Azerbaijan such as The Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and 
Baku-Supsa oil pipelines, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railways, and Baku-Tbilisi highway 
pass through the territory of the Tovuz region.  
For the purpose of examining the selected case study, the thesis will employ the 
concept of small states and the security strategies used by them to cope with existing 
threats in the international system. The author will refer to the neorealist perspective on 
the security strategy choices of small states and the factors that influence their security 
policy decisions. In order to cope with threats and uncertainties emanating from the 
anarchic structure of the international system, small states employ various strategies: 
balancing, bandwagoning, neutrality, and strategic hedging. Balancing strategy refers to 
confronting and defying the source of threat by internal build-up or forming alliances. 
Bandwagoning manifests alignment with a source of threat. Neutrality strategy signals 
great powers that a small state will not take part in a great power competition and its 
territory will not be used as a staging ground for war. Hedging strategy implies a multi-
vector strategy with the use of mixed policies such as limited bandwagoning, indirect 
balancing, economic pragmatism, binding engagement, and dominance denial. Small 
states pursuing this strategy use contrary policies of engaging with a threatening power, 
and concurrently balancing it in an indirect way. Neorealism contemplates various factors 
that influence the decision of a small state to choose a certain security strategy, such as 
the distribution of power in the international system, interstate enmities, perceived threats, 
aggregate power of the state, and geostrategic location. The author argues that 
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geostrategic location plays a key role in the determination of a security strategy of a small 
state. 
Azerbaijan’s security strategy before the Tovuz clashes has been primarily stable 
and was based on the principle of balanced foreign policy without choosing any great 
power blocks. Azerbaijan has continued its strategic partnership with Russia on 
economic, political, and social issues. Moreover, it has comprehensive energy and 
economic partnership with Western countries and Turkey. Azerbaijan engaged with 
various regional and global powers on matters of mutual interests. Thus, Baku does not 
depend on any of these external forces and has conducted relatively independent foreign 
policy throughout these times. However, Azerbaijan’s security strategy was not always 
this stable. During the presidency of Ayaz Mutalibov (August 1991- March 1992), 
Azerbaijan’s followed a bandwagoning strategy by striving to align with Russia. During 
the presidency of Abulfaz Elchibey (June 1992- September 1993), Azerbaijan has taken 
a clear anti-Russian, pro- Turkish, and pro-Western stance on foreign policy. President 
Elchibey decided to balance against Russia and Iran by aligning with Turkey and the 
West. Both strategies of balancing and bandwagoning failed due to geopolitical and 
domestic reasons respectively. Being a pragmatic leader, Heydar Aliyev took into 
consideration geopolitical realities and decided to pursue a balanced foreign policy. He 
learned from the mistakes of his predecessors and refrained from choosing either a clear 
pro- or anti-Russian approach. After being elected as the president of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev has maintained the foreign policy orientation determined by his 
father and proceeded to balance numerous foreign power influences in the region while 
promoting Azerbaijan’s strategic interests.  
The Tovuz incident was perceived in Azerbaijan as an attack on the vital 
geostrategic corridor. During the clashes, international reactions to his conflict have been 
primarily neutral, asking both sides to immediately stop hostilities. Turkey explicitly 
conveyed its support to Azerbaijan through the statements of the president, the Ministry 
of Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Despite Moscow’s neutral reaction to 
the conflict, Russia conducted joint military exercises with Armenia a day after the end 
of hostilities. Moreover, seven military transport aircrafts delivered more than 400 tons 
of military cargo from Russia to Armenia during and aftermath of the Tovuz incident. 
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Azerbaijani authorities and the society were extremely unhappy with Russia’s intensive 
military support to Armenia right in the middle of the clashes. 
 The main objective of the thesis is to analyze how a small state copes with a shock 
to its security emanating from a conventional military threat. The research question is: 
how does a small state respond to the imminent military threats to its security?  For the 
purpose of the study, the author used a single case study and chose the case of Azerbaijan 
after the Tovuz clashes. This study is original since it scrutinizes a case that is illustrative 
of how small states cope with conventional military threats to their security. The Tovuz 
incident was a shocking event for Azerbaijan since it created an imminent threat to the 
security of the state and its energy infrastructure. The thesis seeks to examine whether 
perceived threats from these clashes changed the security strategy of Azerbaijan. 
Furthermore, the thesis aims to evaluate the overall implications of the Tovuz incident 
and the ways it influenced Azerbaijan’s diplomacy towards external actors. The research 
tasks are to determine short-term shifts in relations with major regional powers as a result 
of Tovuz skirmishes and the potential transformation of Azerbaijan’s security strategy 
towards external powers.  
 The thesis consists of five chapters. It starts with a theoretical framework chapter 
that examines major concepts and theories related to the study. Namely, the concept of a 
small state and the strategies employed by small states are examined in this chapter. 
Moreover, the author used a neorealist perspective on the factors that determine the choice 
of the security strategies and behavior of small states.  The second chapter shortly explains 
the research design, the methods utilized in the research, and provides details regarding 
the data collection process. The next chapter provides a thorough analysis of Azerbaijan’s 
security strategy before the skirmishes and examines a variety of strategies employed by 
Azerbaijani authorities in different periods of history. The fourth chapter provides an 
overview of the Tovuz skirmishes, Azerbaijan’s perception of these skirmishes, and the 
geopolitical context within which it happened. The purpose of this chapter is to identify 
the long-term trends in Azerbaijani security policy. The last chapter analyzes the collected 
data and provides insights on the implications of the Tovuz clashes. It examines the major 
changes that happened in Azerbaijan’s relations with regional powers in response to the 
clashes. Moreover, the overall security strategy is examined in comparison to the policies 
employed before the clashes. Lastly, conclusions of the thesis are provided. 
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1. Theoretical Framework 
 This theoretical chapter seeks to provide an overview of strategies small states 
employ in order to address their security challenges. The first section of the chapter 
provides literature on the definition of a “small state” concept. The traditional and 
relational definitions of a small state will be discussed. Furthermore, an overview of the 
challenges and security options of small states from a neorealist perspective will also be 
provided in this section. The second section of the theoretical chapter seeks to discuss in 
detail traditional alliance strategies utilized by the small states to cope with the challenges 
of the international system. More specifically, the discussion of balancing and 
bandwagoning strategies will be provided and the factors that influence the decision of 
small states to choose either of the strategies will be examined. The third section examines 
the strategy of neutrality. The conceptualization of neutrality and different forms of 
neutrality will be examined in this section. The factors that influence small states’ 
decision to employ this strategy will also be discussed. The last section of the theoretical 
chapter addresses the hedging strategy. An overview of the main elements of strategic 
hedging will be provided. In the last section, the distinction of hedging strategy from 
traditional alliance strategies and neutrality will also be discussed. The strategies 
examined in this chapter will establish the basic framework for the analysis of 
Azerbaijan’s security strategy before and aftermath of the Tovuz skirmishes. It should 
also be specified that the security strategy is a choice a small state makes between 
balancing, bandwagoning, neutrality, and strategic hedging.  
1.1. Small States from a Neorealist Perspective 
 The security strategy of small states in a complex international environment has 
been a significant issue since the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is an increasing 
interest in the security strategy small states employ to address perceived threats within a 
changing geopolitical environment. This section provides an overview of the definition 
of a “small state” concept, challenges that small states face, and strategies they employ in 
order to cope with those challenges. The traditional and relational definitions of a small 
state will also be discussed in this section. The author chooses neorealism as a theoretical 
framework for this research study. The author argues that the geostrategic position of a 
small state is a crucial factor in determining its security strategy choice.  
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First of all, it is important to define a concept of a small state in order to determine 
its insecurities and to clarify its security policy options. There are no generally accepted 
criteria on this concept, although attempts have been made to classify states by area, 
population, and some other characteristics. The concepts of power and influence 
determined by the availability or absence of the resources and capacity are significant in 
the analysis of the definition of small states. Traditionally, the concept of a small state 
was defined as one that is not a great power and thus is not capable of changing the status 
quo in the international system (Wiberg, 1987, p. 340). The main attributes of this concept 
included material factors such as the size of the population, territory, military capacity, 
which determine challenges and policy options of small states (Steinsson & Thorhallsson, 
2017, p.3).  
According to the traditional definition, a small state does not possess the necessary 
capacity to ensure its security and protect its interests (Gunasekara, 2015, p. 213).  The 
traditional definition refers basically to the absolute nature of the power and perceives it 
as a crucial attribute of small states.  It involves quantitative characteristics which can be 
measured by analyzing economic, military, geographic, and other features of a state. 
These quantitative characteristics allow to differentiate the size of the state and classify it 
either as a small state or a great power (Efremova, 2019, p. 102). However, the absence 
of a universally accepted concrete threshold for these quantitative characteristics that 
would allow to clearly distinguish absolute power of a state is a major problem of 
traditional definition (Efremova, 2019, p. 102-103). One of the common factors to 
determine the size of the state is its population. For example, according to the definition 
of the Commonwealth, countries with a population size of 1.5 million people or less 
qualify as small states (Kurecic & Kokotovic, 2017, p. 7). According to Steinsson & 
Thorhallsson (2017, p. 3), “states with up to 30 million inhabitants are sometimes 
considered small, although most academic definitions regard those with less than 10 or 
15 million inhabitants as small”.      
Other scholars perceive the concept of power as a relative attribute and claim that 
the traditional definition is not accurate in explaining the behavior of small states in the 
international arena. Scholars of relational definition assert that small states differ from 
the bigger ones not just by their size or absolute power, but by their goals and functions 
in the international system, by their needs and challenges which are largely determined 
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by their material resources and capabilities, by their geopolitical position and relative 
power in comparison with regional and global actors.  
Rothstein proposed a relational definition of the concept of a small state. “The 
traditional definition is simply unable to explain the influence Small Powers have come 
to exert in world politics” (Rothstein, 1968, p. 21). According to Rothstein (1968, p. 29), 
small states do not trust in their capacity to ensure their own security and survival through 
internal military build-up since they lack necessary material resources. Therefore, they 
are essentially dependent on the assistance of other states or international organizations 
(Rothstein, 1968, p.29). Rothstein’s definition distinguishes small states not just by 
material factors, but also by qualitative features. Discussing an example of Romania 
before World War I, Rothstein (1968, p. 215) states that Romania decided to ally with a 
more powerful side even though this amplified the imbalance of power which is harmful 
to its long interests.  
According to Keohane (1969, p. 296), a small state is characterized by the inability 
to make an impact on the international system, except in cases when they aggregate their 
capacities in such a large group that the impact of each state is minimal. In these states, 
elites do not believe that they can make a substantial influence on the system, “acting 
alone or in a small group” (Keohane, 1969, p. 296). A state’s relative power and ability 
to exert influence are largely determined by the availability of resources. Although small 
states lack those resources and take a small part in international relations, Keohane (1969, 
p. 296) believes that they can still have an impact if they gather up in very large groups, 
mainly under the dominance of the larger power.    
Geostrategic location is the most salient aspect that determines a small state’s 
security strategy. In addition to this, interstate enmities and perceived threats are also very 
important factors in explaining a security strategy that small states choose to follow. 
Besides, the small size of a state does not preclude it from exerting its power in the 
international arena and promoting its national interests. According to Steinsson and 
Thorhallsson (2017, p. 3), “a state with a larger population size may be surrounded by 
one or more great powers, making it relatively small and giving it limited action space in 
its region”. Moreover, states with small populations and territories may have other 
features like abundant natural resources and geo-strategic position which allows it to 
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impose its influence in the region and avoid general restrictions that are encountered by 
small states (Steinsson & Thorhallsson, 2017, p. 3-4). 
Conventionally, small states have a very small influence in the protection of 
international order (Wivel, Bailes, & Archer, 2014, p. 3). The statement that powerful 
states do whatever they can do with their capacity, whereas small states should accept this 
reality was accepted by small states that followed pragmatic foreign policy taking into 
account the interests of great powers situated in close proximity (Wivel, Bailes, & Archer, 
2014, p. 3). This was the only way to survive for small states since the times Thucydides 
expressed this statement long before the contemporary international structure was 
constructed (Wivel, Bailes, & Archer, 2014, p. 3). 
The same rule persisted even after the international system started to 
institutionalize. The major agreements and treaties were concluded among great powers 
which determined the realities on the ground and the rules of the functioning of this 
system. Small states had to just accept those rules and obey them since they were too 
weak to influence decisions of great powers (Wivel, Bailes, & Archer, 2014, p. 3). The 
position of small states substantially deteriorated after the introduction of new 
technological innovations at the beginning of the 20th century because this expanded the 
gap in military and economic capacity between small states and the great powers (Wivel, 
Bailes, & Archer, 2014, p. 3). The technological advances and the subsequently increased 
gap between great powers and small states made the geostrategic location an even more 
important factor for small states. Most of them started relying on their powerful neighbors 
for security or by building coalitions to somehow fix the imbalance in the system 
(Vandenbosch, 1962, p. 301). In a confrontation with a larger neighbor, small states can 
do nothing on their own, therefore the role of strategic location became an even more 
important factor, especially in the geopolitical competition between great powers. The 
formation of the United Nations made the international system highly institutionalized. It 
played a considerable role in the process of decolonization and the establishment of a lot 
of new small states (Wivel, Bailes, & Archer, 2014, p. 4). Furthermore, small states could 
finally raise their problems and promote their interests in the international arena through 
the institutions of the UN.  
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As it was mentioned before, a geostrategic position is a substantial factor that 
determines the needs and challenges of a small state. According to Choi (1995, p. 19), 
“for small states, strategic location is more important than any other factors”. There are 
lots of historical examples when a small state was exposed to aggression because of its 
location and strategic importance. Insu Choi (1995) provides an example of the Second 
World War when Germany attacked Belgium and the Netherlands. Germany attacked 
these countries, not because of their weakness or any other factors, but because these 
small states “happened to be located on the strategic highway to France” (Choi, 1995, p. 
19). On the other hand, an important strategic position could be a valuable advantage for 
a small state depending on a small state’s strategy and great power’s interests. Small states 
can use opportunities that emerge from the great power rivalry to their benefit and thereby 
significantly impact the international system itself. Consequently, small states with 
important geostrategic positions are generally substantial actors in the global arena due 
to their roles as balancers, neutral states, or buffer states. 
National security strategy refers to the deliberate plan designed to allocate 
necessary resources and tools in a coherent way to pursue long-term national goals 
(Gaskarth 2015; Silove, 2017). There are various components of security strategy such as 
foreign, defense, and intelligence policies. This study will specifically look into foreign 
policy and defense policy as these are resources for the state to carry out its strategy. 
Small states encounter various challenges that play a crucial role in the choice of 
their security strategy. Nowadays, small states encounter not only conventional 
challenges like military aggression and inter-state conflicts but also non-conventional 
challenges to their security like global terrorism, energy security, food shortage, cyber 
threat, transnational crime, and so on (Vaicekauskaitė, 2017, p. 9). These challenges are 
considerably more severe for small states than for great powers due to a large gap in 
capabilities. Usually, small states do not have the capacity and material resources to deal 
with these numerous threats to their security. Therefore, they are reliant on external 
powers and international organizations to provide necessary assistance to deal with these 
challenges and ensure survival. International organizations also create a mechanism of 
influence for small states and allow them to promote national interests on equal terms 
with great powers (Sherwood, 2016).  
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As Vaicekauskaitė argues, in order to cope with challenges and ensure their 
security, small states employ various security strategies: balance against great powers or 
potential threats, bandwagon with great powers, stay neutral, or pursue the hedging 
policy. Neorealist stance will be referred to during the discussion of the security 
strategies. According to traditional alliance theory, there are two strategies that small 
states utilize in order to cope with perceived threats: either aligning with great powers 
(bandwagoning) or creating alliances against threatening actors(balancing) 
(Vaicekauskaitė, 2017, p. 10). These strategies have certain drawbacks such as the 
tendency of great powers to limit the actions of small states, impose their policies, 
interfere in the domestic affairs of small states. In order to avoid these drawbacks, some 
small states pursue strategic hedging. This strategy avoids choosing any sides in 
competition between great powers since it fears that this will bring higher insecurity 
(Sherwood, 2016). These states tend to maintain relations with both great powers that 
operate in the region without choosing any sides. Moreover, they use a mix of contrary 
strategies which, on the one hand, aim to promote cooperation with a threatening power, 
on the other hand, it tends to indirectly balance against that state. Another strategy that 
small states employ is a policy of neutrality. Neutral small states don’t choose any sides 
in great power conflicts. They are mainly focused on the protection of their territorial 
integrity in case of its violation, rather than on alliance politics. Moreover, small states 
chose this strategy in order to signal great powers that they are not a source of threat and 
no other great power will use its territory as a staging ground for war.   
1.2. Balancing and Bandwagoning 
 Traditional alliance theory provides two strategies states employ to deal with 
external challenges: balancing strategy and bandwagoning strategy. Balancing strategy 
manifests in the endeavor of countries to balance against the most powerful or threatening 
state in the system by forming a coalition and aggregating capacities to equalize chances. 
Bandwagoning strategy, on the other hand, implies the alignment with a more powerful 
state or the source of threat. It mainly occurs when small states do not have any coalition 
options to balance or when balancing is not possible due to geostrategic reasons. In order 
to maintain their security, small states choose to either balance against the source of threat 
or to align with it.  
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According to the neorealist school, under the anarchic structure of the 
international system, the major goal of states is to survive (Parent & Rosato, 2015, p. 52). 
Systemic factors determine the behavior of states. Proponents of the neorealist school 
believe that achieving the balance of power between competing coalitions in the 
international system would bring stability and order to the system. Neorealism sees the 
balance of power as an automatic and structural reaction to disparities in the distribution 
of power among the states (Parent & Rosato, 2015, p. 52-53). 
Balancing strategy refers to measures employed by the state to enhance its power 
relative to the hegemonic or the most dangerous state through the internal build-up or 
through the formation of a coalition. By employing a balancing strategy, states strive to 
alter the distribution of power in the international system from the one that favors and 
suits the interests of the hegemonic state or coalition (Chong, 2003, p. 5). There are two 
ways of balancing: internal and external balancing. Internal one refers to cases when a 
state enhances its own military, political, and economic capability as a way to oppose a 
certain threatening or hegemonic power, whereas external balancing refers to cases when 
a state aligns with another state or a block of states that aggregate their resources and 
capability against the most threatening state or a coalition of states (Chong, 2003, p. 5). 
Thus, the balancing strategy intends to alter the existing status quo to the new 
circumstances that serve the interests of a balancing coalition. Moreover, the balancing 
strategy creates tensions between the hegemonic coalition and the balancing one due to 
the fact that the latter gradually “challenges the position of the other” which in turn reacts 
to those challenges (Chong, 2003, p. 5).   
According to Kenneth Waltz (1979), the security strategy of states is determined 
by the distribution of power in the international system. The structural factors determine 
the behavior of states in the international arena and reduce their freedom to act as they 
want. Kenneth Waltz (1979) perceived bandwagoning as irrational and did not believe 
that any state would choose this strategy since this is not consistent with behavior dictated 
by structural factors. According to Waltz (1979, p.126), if states wanted to maximize their 
power, there would not be balances in the system and the supremacy of one state would 
be maintained. However, this is not the case in the international system since “balancing, 
not bandwagoning, is the behavior induced by the system” (Waltz, 1979, p.126). 
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Kenneth Waltz believed that states tend to choose a balancing security strategy in 
response to the growing power. However, Stephen Walt included a new aspect to the 
balancing theory: he suggested that states balance against the threat, not power. Moreover, 
he claimed that small states are not concerned with the balance of power within the 
international system, they are rather concerned with those states that pose the threat to 
their security and survival (Walt, 1987; Choi, 1995, p. 36). Walt’s theory is rather 
different since the concept of threat is more comprehensive than the concept of power 
and encompasses more variables such as “aggregate power, proximity to a target, 
offensive capability, and perceived intentions” (Choi, 1995, p. 36). The geographical 
position is one of the vital variables for small states. Unlike Waltz, Stephen Walt accepted 
the possibility of bandwagoning as a rational security strategy for small states. Backing 
the neorealist idea that the distribution of power in the international system is central to 
defining the behavior and security strategy of small states, Walt (1987, p.25) claimed: 
“The weaker the state, the more likely it is to bandwagon. Balancing may seem unwise 
because one’s allies may not be able to provide assistance quickly enough”. Thus, he 
includes new variables by arguing that small states bandwagon when there are no 
alternative allies that would be able to support it when the threatening country is located 
in close proximity and is much more powerful. Stephen Walt’s theory created a new 
platform for the debate regarding the behavior of small states in the international arena 
by adding the possibility of aligning with a threatening state.  
Jack Levy (1989, p. 60) contributed to the discussion by arguing that small states 
are more likely to bandwagon than to balance and the balancing options are primarily 
used by great powers in order to counterweight the rise of future hegemons. Thus, 
according to Levy (1989), balancing is a game of great powers, while small states which 
are located close to more powerful states and great powers chose security strategies that 
ensure their security and survival. In most cases, the strategy that ensures their survival 
contains bandwagoning with powerful states rather than aggregating power against them 
(Levy, 1989, p. 60). 
Bandwagoning is a security strategy in which small states align with more 
powerful and even threatening states in order to safeguard their security. Small states do 
not contribute a lot to the aggregate power of a balancing coalition due to their very small 
capabilities and their contribution does not change a lot in the distribution of power in the 
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international system (Gunasekara, 2015, p. 218). Therefore, the choice of bandwagoning 
eliminates the risks associated with a balancing option, while providing security to the 
small state. We can summarize circumstances in which small states tend to choose 
bandwagoning strategy over balancing one. As it was mentioned before, the weaker states 
are more likely to bandwagon. Moreover, small states are most likely to bandwagon when 
there are no alternative allies and there is a direct threat to their security. Gunasekara 
(2015, p. 217) brings an example of Sri Lanka which chose to bandwagon with Britain 
due to the fact that it could not find any actor in the international arena on which it could 
rely on its security and foreign issues during the proclamation of its independence in 1948. 
Furthermore, it is believed that in the bandwagoning strategy both a small state and great 
power gain profits and have shared interests. Small states have interests such as their 
protection from external threats, peace, and stability in the region and enhancement of its 
status in the international arena. Whereas great powers are motivated by aggregation of 
their capability, preclusion of small states from building a coalition with opposing block 
and maintaining them under their sphere of influence (Choi, 1995, p. 38). However, there 
are also drawbacks of bandwagoning policy for small states such as significant loss of 
state’s autonomy, restrictions in domestic and foreign policies, excessive dependence on 
the great power, and potential participation in great power conflicts (Choi, 1995, p. 38; 
Chong, 2003, p. 6).   
We can observe that the concept of bandwagoning brings a meaning of aligning 
with a more powerful state and all scholars that were mentioned agreed on this definition. 
However, what is a more controversial issue is the reason why states choose to 
bandwagon. Randall Schweller (1994, p.74) significantly contributed to this discussion 
by conceptualizing bandwagoning as a security policy utilized not to ensure security and 
survival as was suggested by previous scholars, but rather to gain a profit from the 
alliance. He asserts that concepts of balancing and bandwagoning are not contrary to each 
other and conceptualized them: “balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses; 
bandwagoning by the opportunity for gain” (Schweller, 1994, p.74) Thus, Schweller 
believed that the major purpose of alignment is not a security and therefore states choose 
bandwagoning strategy not because their survival is threatened by other states, but 
because they want to get a profit from the alliance.  
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According to Mearsheimer, a small state chooses to balance due to various factors. 
First of all, small states tend to align with the weaker coalition since the failure to inhibit 
the rise of a prospective hegemonic power or coalition would put their security and 
survival under threat (Gunasekara, 2015, p, 217). Moreover, another factor that induces 
small states to balance is the perception that they would be able to exert more impact 
within the framework of a weaker coalition (Gunasekara, 2015, p, 217). According to this 
thinking, the balancing allows small states to better promote their national interests and 
be more independent politically. Membership in a more powerful coalition puts some 
restrictions on the political freedom of small states and exerts a considerable influence on 
the internal and foreign policies of small states. 
1.3. Neutrality 
 Various small states have employed the security strategy of neutrality throughout 
history. The strategy of neutrality implies that a state will not participate in wars between 
various powers and will not openly or indirectly support any side of the conflict.  The 
concept of neutrality has developed throughout history “from a purely legal concept to a 
broader political concept” (Morris & White, 2011, p. 105). The strategy of neutrality was 
perceived as an attempt of small states to ensure their security and survival by not 
engaging in a great power coalition, and simultaneously maintaining their sovereignty, 
pursuing its national interests that might be at risk in alternative strategies of balancing 
and bandwagoning (Joenniemi, 1988, p.53). 
The concept of neutrality dates back to the Peloponnesian wars described in the 
Melian Dialogue by Thucydides (Simpson, 2018, p. 122). During the war, a small state 
of Melos employed a strategy of neutrality in order to be left out of a violent armed 
conflict between Athenian and Sparta’s coalitions. Despite this, Athena could not accept 
this neutrality due to the very significant strategic position of Melos which could threaten 
the security of Athena if it decided to align with Sparta (Simpson, 2018, p. 122). Here, 
one side wanted to avoid a war, the other one could not accept even a very small 
possibility of an alliance between Melos and Sparta. Therefore, Athena ignored the 
neutrality of Melos and invaded it. These events demonstrate that the strategy of neutrality 
existed during ancient times, the geographic position of states is very important in the 
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choice of the strategy, and neutrality is to some extent dependent on the approval of the 
nearby great powers (Simpson, 2018, p. 122). 
The concept of neutrality has gained its legal recognition as a right of a state to 
stay neutral during the war times and peace after the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The 
recognition of a neutrality status by the international community was accomplished as a 
result of continuous attempts of Switzerland to achieve this status due to its exposure to 
the threats from great powers (Irfanoglu, 2018, p. 279-280). The legal aspects of 
neutrality, the rights and obligations of states with neutral status in times of war were 
institutionalized during The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 (Agius & Devine, 
2011, p. 270). The Conventions asserted that a neutral state must stay impartial towards 
the warring states, should not participate in the war directly or back military activities of 
any side of the conflict in any way, should not let belligerents infringe upon its neutrality 
and actions made towards the fulfillment of this purpose is not viewed as hostile, and 
should not allow the belligerents to use the territory of a neutral state (Agius & Devine, 
2011, p. 270). Furthermore, according to the Conventions, the belligerents should 
acknowledge the impartiality of a neutral state by not using the territory of a neutral state 
for military purposes (Agius & Devine, 2011, p. 270). If a neutral state fails to accomplish 
its responsibilities, it would be regarded as an abuse of its status and a breach of 
international law. 
The geographic position is a very significant factor that affects the decision of 
adopting and maintaining a neutrality strategy (Simpson, 2018, p. 123). States with an 
important geostrategic position are exposed to numerous threats coming from aggressive 
states that tend to maximize their capability by exploiting other states. States that are 
located far away from great powers and want to maintain the status quo may opt to adopt 
neutrality without having risks of violation of their status by outsiders (Tsebenko & 
Shymchuk, 2017, p.55). Thus, states with insignificant strategic locations for great 
powers are more likely to safeguard their status than states located in the middle of great 
power competition. The neutrality status of a buffer state is especially vulnerable to 
violations during times of war between great powers and/or if there is an equilibrium in 
the balance of power (Tsebenko & Shymchuk, 2017, p. 55). Each side of the conflict 
might exploit the favorable strategic location of a buffer state in order to gain an 
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advantage at the expense of a rival. Throughout history, various states such as Finland or 
Belgium adopted the status of neutrality due to their geographical location. 
Due to the fact that there is no assurance that great powers will respect the 
neutrality of a small state during the war, a neutral state should ensure the credibility of 
its status. In order to do so, small states use a wide range of tools categorized as positive 
and negative elements of neutrality (Tsebenko & Shymchuk, 2017, p. 54). The capacity 
of a small state to assure great powers or warring states that the former’s neutral status 
will benefit the latter is regarded as a positive element of neutrality. A small state should 
demonstrate that the costs of disregarding and infringing upon its neutrality status are 
very high because of possible political profits of maintaining the status quo (Tsebenko & 
Shymchuk, 2017, p. 54). Another way to prevent the violation of neutrality status is by 
developing a military capability and strengthening a defensive infrastructure. Karsh 
called this a negative element of neutrality. It is a deterrence strategy aimed at 
demonstrating a readiness to defend its sovereignty and maximizing the costs of 
infringement upon neutrality (Tsebenko & Shymchuk, 2017, p. 54). 
There are various types of neutrality. The first type is de jure neutrality which 
consists of two forms: permanent neutrality and “neutralization” (Simpson, 2018, p. 124). 
One of the major characteristics of permanent neutrality is its voluntary nature and its 
applicability not only during the war times but also during the peace. This form of 
neutrality is based on international legal arrangements and is also codified in the domestic 
law of a given state (Agius & Devine, 2011, p. 267). This type of neutrality has no time 
boundary and is not attached only to a certain armed conflict. A state with such a status 
is not allowed to be a member of a military organization or to have a foreign military base 
(Gavrilova & Tryma, 2015). Maintaining neutrality in peaceful times is important since 
provocative activities of a state during the peace might create ambiguity as for the real 
status of a state and might later drag it into a war as a side of the conflict (Radoman, 2019, 
p. 8). The most prominent example of this type of neutrality is Switzerland. Its status of 
neutrality was accepted by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 (Agius & Devine, 2011, p. 
267). Another form of de jure neutrality is a neutralization of a state imposed as a result 
of the international agreement. These states did not choose to be neutral voluntarily, but 
rather their status was determined and imposed by the international community or 
external powers (Agius & Devine, 2011, p. 268). Neutralized states have a legal 
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obligation to maintain and adhere to their neutrality. Two prominent examples are cases 
of Austria and Finland. As a result of WW2, Austria was convinced to accept neutrality 
as a requirement for its independence.  
The second type of neutrality is ad hoc neutrality. According to this type, states 
adopt neutrality temporarily or during a certain war between other states (Simpson, 2018, 
p. 124). States with ad hoc neutrality stay away from war theater both directly and 
indirectly. Moreover, they should ensure the absence of a foreign army on its territory 
during the war (Gavrilova & Tryma, 2015). Ad hoc neutral states do not provide any legal 
guarantees that they would stay neutral during other wars that will happen in the future 
(Simpson, 2018, p. 124). 
De facto neutral states are the states that practice neutrality in their foreign policy 
without referring to the international agreement or internal legal regulation (Simpson, 
2018, p. 124). There is no legal aspect that requires these states to obey their neutrality 
status, which specifies their rights and duties. It is a matter of foreign policy and decisions 
of a state expressed in practice. Despite the absence of legal regulation, the international 
community generally recognizes the status of de facto neutral states (Simpson, 2018, p. 
124). 
Finally, the last type of neutrality is non-alignment or positive neutrality which 
developed during the Cold War. Since those times, the concept of neutrality has been 
largely used in the denotation of non-alignment. During the Cold War, various states 
decided to refrain from aligning with either the United States or the Soviet Union by 
adopting a neutral position in their foreign policy (Stojanovic, 1981, p. 444). Thus, it 
mainly refers to the neutrality towards the political conflict between great powers during 
times of peace. This type of neutrality refers to the security strategy of states which 
refrained from joining any military coalition with competing great powers during times 
of peace (Stojanovic, 1981, p. 444). Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the political 
status of a non-aligned state does not exclude the possibility of its involvement in armed 
conflicts that concern its national interest or security and does not engage a great power 
(Agius & Devine, 2011, p. 268). Most states with positive neutrality are members of the 
Non-Aligned Movement. 
1.4. Strategic Hedging 
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 Strategic hedging is a security strategy that enables small states to tackle their 
security concerns emerging from the uncertainty and risks of the anarchic international 
system by conducting two contrary policies. It includes engagement with a threatening 
force in different ways such as by promoting cooperation in various fields, enhancing 
diplomatic relations, joining multilateral organizations led by that power (Kuik, 2020). 
Simultaneously, hedging strategy contains indirect balancing policies against that 
concrete power by developing military capacity, joining non-military multilateral 
alliances and so on (Kuik, 2020). This strategy allows small states to escape a direct 
confrontation with the threatening force despite their balancing behavior. Small states 
also use strategic hedging as a way to pursue an equidistant foreign policy towards several 
global or regional powers (Kuik, 2020). Additionally, hedging gives a certain degree of 
independence in the foreign policy framework of a small state (Wu, 2016). Hedging 
strategy allows states to enhance their relative capability in the international arena while 
avoiding direct confrontation with great power (Geeraerts & Salman, 2016, p. 62).  
According to Koga, the major impetus for states to pursue strategic hedging is “to 
reduce the risks and uncertainties associated with a particular course of action—balancing 
or bandwagoning” (Koga, 2018, p. 638). Open balancing strategy aggravates tension and 
provokes a threatening power, whereas hedging strategy enables a small state to enhance 
its capacity and evade confrontation with that power by upholding a cooperative stance. 
Despite the above-mentioned advantages of hedging, it should also be mentioned that this 
strategy carries “a risk of sending mixed signals” (Koga, 2018, p. 638). Due to its 
ambiguous nature, a hedging behavior of a small state might be misinterpreted by a great 
power, thus leading to tensions between states and increased pressures imposed on a small 
state in order to determine its political stance (Koga, 2018, p. 639). 
Cheng-Chwee Kuik (2008, p. 163) defined hedging as “a behavior in which a 
country seeks to offset risks by pursuing multiple policy options that are intended to 
produce mutually counteracting effects under the situation of high-uncertainties and high-
stakes”. This definition is quite similar to the ones provided above since it refers to cases 
when states employ a wide range of policies that retain ambiguity and escapes the 
challenges and risks that exist when states employ only balancing or bandwagoning 
strategies. The choice of a security strategy vis-a-vis external powers primarily depends 
on whether the state faces an “imminent security threat” (Kuik, 2008, p. 64). When a 
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small state perceives a certain external power as a direct threat, it is likely to employ a 
balancing policy against that power. However, Kuik (2008, p. 64) emphasizes that in most 
cases “elites do not perceive any imminent and unambiguous threat”. Consequently, most 
states employ a hedging strategy in the circumstance of an absence of an imminent threat 
to their security. 
In his article, Kuik (2008) introduced five elements of hedging strategy: economic 
pragmatism, binding engagement, dominance-denial, limited bandwagoning, and indirect 
balancing. The economic pragmatism component of hedging strategy constitutes a 
behavior in which a state strives to gain economic benefits from the close engagement 
with great power, despite any political tensions and challenges in their bilateral relations 
(Kuik, 2008, p. 167). Binding engagement implies a behavior in which a state regularly 
socializes with great power through various channels, and “institutionalizes its relations 
with a power by enmeshing it in regularized diplomatic activities” (Kuik, 2008, p. 167). 
The major goal of this policy is to establish mechanisms through which a state can affect 
a great power’s foreign policy options and eliminate its offensive inclinations. Limited 
bandwagoning refers to a political partnership between a small state and a great power, 
within which a small state coordinates its policy with a great power on certain issues and 
there are also elements of intentional deference in certain issues. Concurrently, a small 
state continues its partnership with other powers and does not lose its autonomy in foreign 
policy. The dominance denial component of hedging strategy implies a close engagement 
with other powers in regional issues and refuting the establishment of hegemonic 
dominance in the region (Kuik, 2008, p. 170). Indirect balancing refers to “a policy 
wherein a state makes military efforts to cope with diffuse uncertainties by forging 
defense cooperation and by upgrading its own military” (Kuik, 2008, p. 170). 
According to Kuik (2020), the hedging behavior of a small state does not target a 
certain threat or power, but rather it intends to counterweigh a lot of perceived threats, 
risks, and insecurities that arise from the self-help nature of the international system. He 
defined three characteristics of hedging strategy: refraining from choosing sides and 
highlighting non-alignment position; maintaining an ambiguous policy of “deference and 
defiance” in order to escape various threats and risks; and tendency to follow distinct 
positions in order “to keep options open” (Kuik, 2020). 
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In his article, Le Hong Hiep (2013) conceptualized hedging as a strategy 
consisting of mixed policy tools that simultaneously enhances collaboration with partner 
states and counterweighs prospective dangers and risks coming from them in order to 
tackle ambiguity regarding the intentions and future behavior of partners. All states have 
almost the same tools ranging “along a continuum extending from pure bandwagoning to 
pure balancing” (Hiep, 2013, p. 337). Nevertheless, each state selects different tools and 
attaches different importance to each tool depending on how the state perceives its 
partner. By having a wide range of tools, states gain flexibility in their foreign policy and 
“easily move back and forth along the bandwagoning-balancing continuum, depending 
on developments in bilateral relations and changes in the international environment” 
(Hiep, 2013, p. 337). Le Hong Hiep discussed Vietnam’s hedging strategy and specific 
tools used in its relations with China. According to him, Vietnam has used four tools: an 
economic pragmatism-expanding partnership in the economic sphere; direct engagement- 
enhancing bilateral instruments with the aim of developing mutual trust between states; 
hard balancing- developing and modernizing army and military infrastructure to create 
deterrence mechanism from potential aggression, and soft balancing- involvement in 
various international and regional organizations, and developing relations with other 
global or regional powers in order to resist possible pressures exerted by China (Hiep, 
2013, p. 344). 
Hedging is different from balancing in a sense that the latter is an explicit behavior 
of defying a threatening state by building its own capability or joining a military alliance, 
whereas the former contains some challenging and defying policies, but in a careful, 
limited, and ambiguous way so that it does not provoke a threatening state to undertake 
countermeasures (Kuik, 2020). Thus, by utilizing certain limited compliant and 
cooperative policies, hedging tends to evade pressures and conflict with a threatening 
state which are the risks associated with cases of balancing behavior. In relation to the 
bandwagoning strategy, hedging differs by the limited nature of its acquiescence and 
avoidance of making an obvious siding with any global or regional power (Kuik, 2020). 
The distinction of hedging strategy from neutrality is less clear than from cases of 
balancing and bandwagoning. There is a similarity between concepts in the sense that in 
both cases a small state chooses not to align and take sides in great power competition. 
However, states with a hedging strategy are relatively independent actors and are usually 
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very active in the international arena by engaging with various partners (Guzansky, 2015). 
Hedging does not follow a firm non-alignment policy due to the fact that states employing 
strategic hedging usually join multilateral alliances, thus developing and enhancing 
cooperation and partnership with various powers. “Hedging-based alignments are based 
on selective converging pragmatism, as opposed to a rigid mutual defense commitment” 
(Kuik, 2020). Such an alignment is usually flexible, dynamic, “adaptable to changing 
relations and evolving environment” and is based on the needs of the parties and the 
interest convergence (Kuik, 2020). Consequently, when interests of parties converge in 
certain areas and at certain times, then the alignment enlarges; when interests do not 
match at those areas, then alignment breaks up.   
Various scholars provided different conceptual frameworks of the main 
components of hedging strategy. In the current research study, the author employed the 
conceptual framework developed by Cheng-Chwee Kuik. The components of the hedging 
strategy introduced by Kuik are applicable to the case of Azerbaijan.  
1.5. Conclusion 
This chapter provided an overview of the traditional and relational approaches to 
the concept of a small state. Furthermore, the challenges and strategies utilized by a small 
state to guarantee its security have also been reviewed. The author employed a neorealist 
stance in the discussion of different security strategies used by small states. A balancing 
strategy is used to confront the source of threat by forming or joining the already existing 
counterbalancing coalition. Structural factors determine the choice of this policy. 
Bandwagoning strategy, on the other hand, is employed by a small state to align with the 
source of threat. Several factors influence the decision of a small state to employ this 
strategy: proximity to the source of threat, perceived intentions, aggregate power of a 
small state, and offensive power of the source of threat. Neutrality strategy is employed 
by a small state to signal it would not take part in the rivalry between great powers and 
its territory would not be used against any power. The choice of this strategy is also 
largely dictated by geopolitical factors. Strategic hedging means a pursuit of an 
equidistant foreign policy by engaging with various powers, joining non-military 
organizations, and employing defying or limited balancing against the source of threat 
when it is needed. The choice of a hedging strategy by a small state is rationalized by the 
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desire to eliminate risks that are existent in other strategies. Small states employing this 
strategy strive to conduct autonomous foreign policy and make pragmatic decisions in 
























2. Methodology  
This chapter will clarify the research design and explain the case selection. 
Moreover, data collection methods, the sampling process, and the choice of interviewees 
will be discussed in the following chapter.  
2.1. Research design and the case selection 
The research is based on a single case study of Azerbaijan’s security strategy in a 
timeframe between the end of the Tovuz clashes and immediately before the Second 
Karabakh war. A single case study allows exploring the single phenomenon over a 
specific period of time through a very detailed data collection from numerous sources 
(Landman, 2008, p. 92). Moreover, it enables the researcher to thoroughly examine the 
given issue taking into account different circumstances. A single case study is the best 
option for this research study since it allows for in-depth study of a case and permits to 
capture of nuances and complexities better than other designs.  
The current case of Tovuz clashes was selected due to the fact that it is based on 
recent events and its results were supposed to impact Azerbaijan’s security strategy taking 
into account the perceived threat to a very important strategic area of Azerbaijan where 
all the vital transportation routes pass through. The research study explores the security 
strategy employed by a small state in response to the imminent threat perceptions. The 
study of the current case requires a thorough analysis of Azerbaijan’s diplomacy before 
the Tovuz clashes and an examination of various strategies used by Azerbaijani elites 
throughout history. This analysis is required in order to identify the long-term trends in 
Azerbaijan’s security policy, which would later allow the author to contextualize Baku’s 
reactions to the clashes. Then, a detailed analysis of the Tovuz clashes and their 
implications is needed to determine the potential change in Azerbaijan’s strategy in 
comparison to previous years. Hence, the analysis of Tovuz clashes provides a very 
interesting case for examining the behavior of small states during the period of increased 
threat perceptions to their security. 
2.2. Research methods and data collection 
The focus of this research study is to examine the implications of the Tovuz 
fighting and its impact on Azerbaijan’s security strategy. In order to evaluate the potential 
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transformation of Baku’s diplomacy towards external powers, the author established 
communication with political experts, former diplomats, and researchers working in think 
tanks. The author attempted to establish contact with members of the foreign policy elite 
such as a spokesperson of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy 
Advisor of the President of Azerbaijan. However, due to various reasons, they did not 
manage to provide their valuable views on this topic. Since the author did not manage to 
get access directly to diplomats and foreign policy advisors, it was decided to interact 
with political experts working in think tanks, former diplomats, and members of academic 
circles. The expert interview is relevant to this study because expert knowledge “has the 
power to produce practical effects” and is presumed to be influential in the societies they 
live in (Bogner & Menz, 2009, p. 54). Some of the interviewed experts are very close to 
foreign policy elites and their opinion is highly valued among political elites. For 
example, one of the interviewed experts is Dr. Farid Shafiyev, who is currently a chairman 
of the Baku-based think tank. Moreover, Dr. Farid Shafiyev has been an ambassador of 
Azerbaijan to Canada from 2009 to 2014, and to the Czech Republic from 2014 to 2019. 
The author employed the purposive sampling technique since the chosen sample 
was based on the judgment of the author. He purposefully selected the political experts 
that are either close to foreign policy elites of Azerbaijan or work in research institutes. 
The author chose qualitative interview as a major data collection method that would allow 
examining the views of experts on Azerbaijan’s diplomacy after the Tovuz clashes. 
Expert interviews have been conducted with six participants. Due to Covid-19 related 
restrictions, it was decided to conduct interviews in virtual circumstances, rather than 
face-to-face interaction.  
For the implementation of interviewing process, the author has developed open-
ended questions. It was aimed to gather comprehensive views of experts on the given 
issue and engage the experts in broad discussions (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002, p. 674).  
Open-ended questions enable the interviewees “to organize their answers within their 
own frameworks and this increases the validity of the responses” (Aberbach & Rockman, 
2002, p. 674). Although interview questions had been primarily designed beforehand, the 
interviewer asked additional follow-up questions throughout the interview in order to gain 
more complete insight on experts’ opinions on the issue. A semi-structured interview 
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enabled the interviewer to discover new subjects related to the issue and evaluate the 
research question through another angle (Puyvelde, 2018, p. 382).  
The author will examine the implications of the Tovuz clashes and the shifts in 
Azerbaijan’s security strategy through the analysis of in-depth interviews with experts. 
Empirical data would be gathered not only from an interview process but also from 
various primary sources such as news media, official statistical data, bilateral agreements 
between Azerbaijan and regional powers, speeches of high-ranking officials that were 
conveyed during and after the Tovuz incident. Furthermore, the author will employ 
secondary sources in the examination of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy behavior before the 
July skirmishes. Relevant scholarly articles and think tank publications will be analyzed 
for that purpose. Thus, the data collected through qualitative interviews would be further 
bolstered by the examination of numerous official documents, statistical data, and 
journalistic reports. The author used the triangulation approach by collecting data from 
multiple sources. The combination of different data sources enables the researcher to 
develop a more thorough and comprehensive explanation of a phenomenon (Carter et al., 
2014, p.545; Puyvelde, 2018, p. 378). This approach has also been regarded “as a 
qualitative research strategy to test validity through the convergence of information from 
different sources” (Carter et al., 2014, p.545).  
Since the main question of this research study is how Azerbaijan’s security 
strategy changed after the Tovuz clashes, the author would attempt to find out in which 
way has Azerbaijan’s security policy shifted, either towards bandwagoning, balancing, 
neutrality, or hedging.  Any change in Azerbaijan’s security policy will be reflected in 
the analysis of interview results, speeches of high-ranking officials, and tangible changes 
in defense procurement and military exchanges. The author will determine the security 
strategy by looking at changes in diplomatic activities of Azerbaijan, the intensity of 
diplomatic engagements, and military cooperation with regional powers. The views of 
interviewed experts will be crucial in the analysis of the implication of Tovuz clashes and 
subsequent changes in the security policy of Baku. The interviewees’ insight will help to 
determine whether there has been a fundamental transformation of Azerbaijan’s 
diplomacy towards external actors, in what ways Tovuz clashes influenced Azerbaijan’s 
foreign policy, and what is the basis of Azerbaijan’s security strategy. 
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3. Azerbaijan’s security strategy since its independence  
 This chapter analyzes Azerbaijan’s security strategy in different periods of 
contemporary history. In the first section, security policies during the period of 
Mutallibov (August 1991-March 1992) and Elchibey (June 1992-September 1993) 
presidencies will be examined. The second section provides an analysis of Azerbaijan’s 
diplomacy with external powers during the presidency of Heydar Aliyev (October 1993-
October 2003). The last section explores patterns of Azerbaijan’s security strategy during 
the period of Ilham Aliyev’s presidency (2003-present).   
3.1. Azerbaijan’s security strategy during the Mutallibov and Elchibey presidencies: 
two opposite strategies 
3.1.1. Introduction 
Azerbaijan experienced a period of high political and economic instability upon 
independence from Soviet rule. At that time, Azerbaijan was in a deep economic and 
political crisis that was further intensified by the war in Nagorno-Karabakh (1988-1994). 
The absence of clear strategy, frequent change of leadership, and the war with Armenia 
added to the already unstable economy inherited from the Soviet Union. Azerbaijan was 
in a deep economic recession. The government could not control the inflation rate, “which 
increased from an annual rate of 616 percent in 1992 to 1130 percent in 1993” (Cornell, 
2011, p. 74). Azerbaijan’s Armed Forces were established in October 1991. It was 
“followed by the formation of two tactical motor brigades of the Armed Forces from the 
military establishment of the former Soviet Army located in the town of Shikh” 
(Mod.gov.az). During those times, armed forces primarily consisted of local voluntary 
battalions led by self-proclaimed warlords.  
During the early independence period, Azerbaijan’s security strategy frequently 
changed due to repeated shifts in power. Mutallibov and Elchibey choose traditional 
strategies of bandwagoning and balancing respectively. Both strategies were inefficient. 
Mutallibov’s policy was inefficient due to domestic factors, whereas Elchibey’s strategy 
failed due to geopolitical reasons. Mutallibov wrongly assumed that the pro-Russian 
stance would help to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and safeguard Azerbaijan’s 
territorial integrity. Moreover, he did not take into account anti-Russian tendencies within 
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society after Soviet military forces violently suppressed the pro-independence movement 
in January 1990. Elchibey wrongly assumed that a pro-Turkish and pro-Western stance 
would help in confrontation against Russia and Armenia. His foreign policy was purely 
ideological and did not take into account geopolitical realities. 
3.1.2. Ayaz Mutallibov’s presidency: Bandwagoning strategy (August 1991-March 
1992) 
Ayaz Mutallibov became the first president of Azerbaijan after the announcement 
of independence in October 1991. Having strong links with Russia and being a former 
Soviet politician, Mutallibov chose a clear pro-Russian foreign policy and counted on 
Moscow for assistance in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Gvalia et al., 2013, p. 127).  
He did not actually accept the fall of the Soviet Union and perceived Russia as a sole 
arbiter in the South Caucasus (Cornell, 2011, p. 59). Moreover, he believed that Moscow 
would sooner or later recreate a new alliance of former Soviet states. Although Turkey 
was the first country to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan, “relations with Turkey 
and the West carried mainly a formal nature” (Cornell, 2011, p. 309). Despite 
considerable domestic disapproval and obvious wrath towards Russia due to aggression 
against civilians in Baku during the events of January 20, 1990, Ayaz Mutallibov wanted 
Azerbaijan to become a member of the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) (MacDougall, 2009, p. 223). This created huge domestic discontent due to the fact 
that people demanded complete independence and did not want to join any pro-Russia 
coalition. Membership in the CIS was perceived by the general public and opposition 
groups as losing sovereignty to Moscow again. In December 1991, Mutallibov signed the 
Alma-Ata Agreement to join the CIS. The pro-Russian vector of his policy was so robust 
that Mutallibov ignored the necessity of building an army despite the fact that during 
those times the country was in the condition of war with Armenia (MacDougall, 2009, p. 
224). He was highly reliant on Russia in that sense and believed that Russia would resolve 
the conflict to Azerbaijan’s benefit if the latter join the CIS. Mutallibov’s diplomacy is a 
primary evidence for the bandwagoning strategy in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy during 
the early independence.   
After Mutallibov’s decision to become a member of the CIS, an agreement was 
supposed to be ratified by the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan. In exchange for that, Yeltsin 
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gave his word to disband “the 366th motorized infantry brigade of the Russian Interior 
Ministry that later played a crucial role in the occupation of Khojaly” (Abilov & Isayev, 
2015, p.119). Nevertheless, the suggestion was not ratified by the Supreme Soviet and 
shortly after this decision, horrible atrocities happened in Khojaly. Despite Mutallibov’s 
pro-Russian foreign policy, Armenian forces which were supported by the Russian 366th 
motorized infantry brigade occupied Khojaly and massacred innocent civilian population 
that was trying to flee from the city (MacDougall, 2009, p.224). These events 
demonstrated that Russia clearly supported Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
despite all the efforts of Mutallibov to gain Russian support. Mutallibov failed to defend 
its nation’s interests, to establish a professional army, and prevent atrocities against its 
population, and rather tried to align Azerbaijan with Russia and rely on its help. He 
decided to bandwagon with a source of threat and relied on its security guarantees, 
without taking into account internal political processes. As a result of large-scale protests 
after the Khojaly massacre, Ayaz Mutallibov was forced to resign under popular pressure 
in March 1992. 
3.1.3. Abulfaz Elchibey’s presidency: Balancing strategy (June 1992-September 
1993) 
In June 1992, Abulfaz Elchibey, a member of a Popular Front Party, was elected 
as the president of Azerbaijan. Nationalists under the rule of Elchibey promoted the 
ideology of Pan-Turkism.  During Elchibey’s presidency, foreign policy choices were 
primarily driven by ideological factors, rather than material ones. Nationalists were 
striving to develop a very strong relationship with Turkey and move away from Russian 
influence. Thus, Elchibey sought a pro-Western foreign policy and relied on Turkey’s 
help in establishing Western support. Azerbaijani authorities blamed Russia for its 
military support to Armenian forces in Khojaly and this caused the pro-Russian elite to 
lose its power grounds in Azerbaijan (Shiriyev, 2019, p. 6). Despite the fact that the 
majority of the members of the nationalist party supported the pro-Turkish position, some 
members of the government condemned overreliance on Turkey (Shiriyev, 2019, p. 6). 
Azerbaijan’s relations with Turkey considerably improved during this period. “Elchibey’s 
foreign policy priorities were based on a belief that Turkey, not Russia, was the best 
model of development for Azerbaijan” (Gvalia et al., 2013, p.127). Elchibey openly 
35 
 
expressed that the Turkic identity of Azerbaijan is more important than the Muslim 
identity and it was taken as a basis for the foreign policy orientation.  
At the beginning of his presidency, Elchibey tried to form friendly relations with 
Russia in order to achieve its neutrality in the conflict, and the pro-Russian leaders of the 
Azerbaijani army played an important part in this decision. However, after realizing that 
Russia would not take a neutral position in the conflict, Elchibey removed all pro-Russian 
staff from governmental offices in order to reduce the Kremlin’s influence (Shiriyev, 
2019, p. 6). Russia was dissatisfied with its diminished influence in Azerbaijani domestic 
structures and with the increased influence of the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) in negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Since 
Russia perceived these countries in its sphere of its influence, Moscow wanted to be the 
main mediator between two rivals in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Abilov & Isayev, 
2015, p.122). Moreover, Moscow made a proposal to send its military forces to the line 
of contact between two warring post-Soviet countries (Abilov & Isayev, 2015, p.122). 
However, Azerbaijani authorities were against this proposal since it was perceived as an 
attempt to separate Nagorno-Karabakh from other regions of Azerbaijan. Elchibey 
insisted on the full removal of Russian troops from its territory. Thus, Azerbaijan became 
the first post-Soviet country that fully removed all Russian military bases from its territory 
(Ozturk, 2013, p.8).  
Despite considerable Russian pressures, Azerbaijani authorities were unwilling to 
approve membership in the CIS. Elchibey was overall suspicious regarding Russian 
intentions since he was aware of the Russian support to Armenia (MacDougall, 2009, 
p.231-232). His suspicions further intensified after Armenia decided to join the CIS 
Collective Security Treaty in May 1992 (MacDougall, 2009, p.231). During that period, 
Azerbaijani authorities perceived Russia as the major threat to the existence of an 
independent Azerbaijan due to the fact that CIS was regarded as an attempt to collect all 
the former countries of the USSR under a new organization and revive an old union.  
During Elchibey’s tenure, Baku wanted to align with Turkey and to expand its 
relationship with the United States in order to balance Russian influence in the region. 
However, at that time, Turkey’s interests in the South Caucasus were limited to the 
promotion of economic cooperation with newly established states (Shaffer, 2012, p.76). 
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Turkey did not want to directly engage in this region’s conflicts and was not interested in 
forming a military alliance with Baku at that time (Shaffer, 2012, p.76). Despite Turkey’s 
support of Azerbaijan expressed in the international arena, this was not what Azerbaijani 
authorities were expecting from its closest allies. Elchibey expected more active measures 
from Ankara to protect Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity (Shaffer, 2012, p. 76). However, 
he did not recognize the geopolitical situation in the Caucasus, numerous restrictions on 
Ankara’s foreign policy coming from membership in NATO, Turkey’s own foreign 
policy problems regarding Cyprus, and Armenian accusations of genocide (Ozturk, 2013, 
p. 10). Furthermore, in order to protect Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, Turkey had to 
confront Armenia’s closest ally, the Russian Federation. At that time, Turkey was not 
powerful enough to openly challenge Russia and to deter Russia from its involvement in 
the conflict (Ozturk, 2013, p.10). Thus, Elchibey wrongly assumed that common identity 
would lead to a military coalition between Turkey and Azerbaijan which would ensure 
the latter’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (Shaffer, 2012, p.76). 
Elchibey’s belief that the development of democratic tendencies and the choice of 
a pro-Western stance would persuade the US to back Baku in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict and other regional security issues also failed. Despite Elchibey’s efforts to 
improve relations with the West, Azerbaijan was the only post-Soviet country that did not 
get governmental aid from the United States under Section 907 of the Freedom Support 
Act which was legislated under the pressure of the Armenian Diaspora in the US (Cornell, 
2011, p.71; Shaffer, 2012, p.76). Due to the intense propaganda of pro-Armenia media 
outlets in the US and the influence of the Armenian Diaspora, Azerbaijan was regarded 
as an aggressor in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict despite being exposed to occupation 
and ethnic cleansing of its population (Cornell, 2011, p.71). Hence, the Armenian Lobby 
contributed to the lack of support to Azerbaijan by the US. 
During the presidency of Abulfaz Elchibey, relations between Azerbaijan and Iran 
significantly deteriorated. President Elchibey carries responsibility for transforming the 
relationship with Iran into a hostile one. Even though Iran officially claimed its neutral 
position in the Nagorno-Karabakh war and several times attempted to be a mediator in 
negotiations, Azerbaijani authorities did not trust Iran and perceived its intentions as 
malign (MacDougall, 2009, p. 233-234). Furthermore, Elchibey several times criticized 
Iran for the marginalization and cultural repression of ethnic Azerbaijanis living in Iran 
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(Cornell, 2011, p. 70). The most significant issue that damaged relations with Iran was 
Elchibey’s claims to the northern regions of Iran. He promoted the idea of liberation of 
“South Azerbaijan” and its unification with the Republic of Azerbaijan (Shaffer, 2012, 
p.76). Elchibey and his PFA party have sought a very close connection with around 20 
million ethnic Azerbaijanis that comprise an absolute majority of the population in the 
northern regions of Iran (MacDougall, 2009, p.233). Thus, the idea of unification of 
northern and southern Azerbaijan was one of the cores of Elchibey’s foreign policy. 
Elchibey’s statements prompted Tehran to support Armenia in the conflict since Baku 
was perceived as a real threat to Iran’s territorial integrity. 
The pro-Turkish foreign policy of the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) and 
parliament’s constant refusal to approve membership in the CIS had negative 
consequences for Azerbaijan because Russia was induced to further intensify its military 
support for Yerevan (Cornell, 2011, p.311). At the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, Russia did not have a clearly defined foreign policy, and its position residing on 
the Armenian side was mainly grounded on religious identity (Abushov, 2009, p.196). 
However, Russia’s position on the Armenian side in the conflict further strengthened and 
Moscow utilized the conflict as leverage against Azerbaijan after Baku disapproved of 
the involvement in the CIS and decided to get rid of the Russian military presence in 
Azerbaijan. 
Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia further deteriorated after APF invited Western 
oil companies to Baku in order to hold negotiations regarding the development and 
exploitation of oil fields in Azerbaijan’s sector of the Caspian basin. Azerbaijani 
authorities did not request Russian companies to join the consortium since Elchibey did 
not want to make even the slightest concession to Russia in this matter either. In 
September 1992, an agreement was reached with the British Petroleum and Statoil 
companies on the joint development of a proven Chirag oil field and assessment of an 
unverified area called Shahdeniz (Bagirov, 1996, p.7). During that year, Azerbaijan 
signed several more arrangements with Pennzoil and Ramco regarding the promising 
Guneshli field (Bagirov, 1996, p.7). In June 1993, Azerbaijan was expected to sign an 
ultimate contract with several western oil companies regarding the extraction of 
Azerbaijani oil resources (Abilov, 2010, p.127). Russia did not recognize the validity of 
these contracts by arguing that Azerbaijan does not have a legal right to exclusively 
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exploit the natural resources of the Caspian basin due to its unresolved legal status. In 
addition, “redefining the Caspian’s status as an isolated intercontinental Salt Lake, the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has called for joint ownership and development of 
Caspian Sea resources” (MacDougall, 1997, p.93).  
Despite its military failures in Karabakh, the APF did not agree to make 
concessions to Russian demands in numerous issues such as oil extraction in the Caspian 
Sea, membership in the CIS, and Russian military presence in Azerbaijan. The 
consequences of Elchibey’s hostile attitude towards Russia and Iran were very costly. 
Russia managed to undermine the power of the APF by effectively using its leverage in 
the face of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the unresolved status of the Caspian Sea, and 
pro-Russian forces inside Azerbaijan. The loss of new territories in Nagorno-Karabakh 
and coup d’état organized by colonel Suret Huseynov forced Abulfaz Elchibey to leave 
his office in June 1993.   
3.1.4. Conclusion 
Ayaz Mutallibov chose a strategy of aligning with Russia despite domestic 
disapproval. Being a former Soviet politician, he wanted to integrate Azerbaijan into the 
Russian-led CIS. Mutallibov hoped that a pro-Russian stance would gain Moscow’s 
support in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Domestic unwillingness to join the CIS led to 
the participation of the Russian infantry brigade along with Armenian forces in the 
occupation of Khojaly which resulted in a horrible tragedy against the Azerbaijani civilian 
population.  
Elchibey did not understand geopolitical realities on the ground and regional 
distribution of power. He chose a clear and direct balancing strategy against the Russian 
Federation while not taking into account the inability and unwillingness of Turkey to 
directly confront Moscow. Moreover, despite Elchibey’s attempts to gain Western 
support, the US perceived Baku as an aggressor in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict due to 
the influence of the large Armenian Diaspora in the US. Elchibey’s anti-Iranian stance 
and statements regarding the unification of Azerbaijan significantly damaged the relations 
with southern neighbor. His unwillingness to make concessions to Russia prompted 
Moscow to further support Armenia and led to the loss of more territories in the Nagorno-
Karabakh. The balancing strategy against Russia was doomed to failure taking into 
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account the geographical proximity of Russia, the lack of allies at that moment, the 
ongoing war in Nagorno-Karabakh, and internal political and economic crisis. 
3.2. Azerbaijan’s security strategy during Heydar Aliyev’s presidency: the period of 
balanced foreign policy (October 1993-October 2003) 
3.2.1. Introduction 
Substantial losses of Azerbaijan’s territory generated anti-governmental uprisings 
and forced Elchibey to resign in June 1993. In October of the same year, Heydar Aliyev 
was elected as the new President of Azerbaijan. Being a pragmatic leader, Heydar Aliyev 
took into account the realities and difficulties of regional politics and chose to follow a 
multi-vector foreign policy. He did not want to repeat the mistakes of his predecessors by 
choosing either a clear pro- or anti-Russian approach. As Elchibey’s presidency 
empirically demonstrated, Azerbaijan did not have a capacity to balance against Russia 
either by enhancing its internal military capability or by aligning with other powers. 
Internal instability and the lack of available allies would make a further balancing strategy 
suicidal for Azerbaijan. Bandwagoning policy was also not an option because the new 
administration took lessons from Mutallibov’s experience and recognized that 
Azerbaijan’s domestic audience was absolutely against returning back to Russian 
influence. Thus, Azerbaijan could lose its sovereignty if President Aliyev chose to align 
with any external power (Ismailzade, 2004, p.6). Seeking an alliance with the West would 
further anger Russia, aligning with Russia would make Azerbaijan its puppet state and 
would bring Azerbaijan back to depend on Russia (Ismailzade, 2004, p.6). Therefore, 
Heydar Aliyev decided to refrain from pursuing a one-sided approach of either balancing 
or bandwagoning due to Azerbaijan’s very challenging geopolitical and domestic 
environment after the proclamation of independence.  
Being a leader of a small state with abundant energy resources and a favorable 
geostrategic location, Heydar Aliyev managed to pursue an alternative approach of 
strategic hedging in his diplomacy with external powers. The major principles of 
Azerbaijan’s foreign policy orientation during previous presidents were the resolution of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the preservation of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. 
As for other small states, Azerbaijan’s goal was to ensure national security and survival 
of the state by all means. During the presidency of Heydar Aliyev, there were additional 
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aspects that influenced Azerbaijan’s diplomacy. Recognizing challenges imposed on 
Azerbaijan due to geostrategic factors, Heydar Aliyev also comprehended and utilized 
opportunities gained due to the geography. Heydar Aliyev perceived energy resources 
and favorable geostrategic location as an opportunity to engage with various external 
actors and to pursue an active and independent foreign policy in the international arena. 
The new factors enabled Azerbaijan to develop an effective hedging strategy towards the 
major global and regional powers. 
3.2.2. Appeasement of the giant neighbor   
After being elected the head of Parliament in June 1993 during the coup d'état 
against Elchibey, Heydar Aliyev firstly decided to appease Russia and change its attitude 
towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. President Aliyev knew that it would not be 
possible to stop hostilities in Karabakh without gaining Russian trust and making certain 
concessions. The further confrontation with northern neighbors might cause the 
occupation of more Azerbaijani territories. Thus, in order to end the invasion of 
Azerbaijani territories by Armenian forces, and to improve relations with Russia, Heydar 
Aliyev carried out several measures. First of all, he made a visit to Moscow in July 1993 
during which he discussed the prospect of participation in the CIS. In September 1993, 
the related agreements were signed and Azerbaijan finally joined the CIS (Aslanli 2010, 
140). The ratification of membership in the CIS, frequent visits of Heydar Aliyev to 
Moscow, and new agreements between parties are elements of binding engagement and 
limited bandwagoning with Russia. Despite making concession with the CIS 
membership, Heydar Aliyev did not agree with two other Russian demands: the joint 
development and exploitation of Caspian resources and the presence of Russian military 
forces on the Azerbaijani territory (Abushov 2009, 196). At the same time, Heydar Aliyev 
decided to suspend activities of the western businesses operating in Azerbaijan with the 
intention to indicate the relinquishment of a pro-Western stance of foreign policy 
established during the Elchibey rule (Safi & Aslanli 2017, 5). All the above-mentioned 
measures were also made because Heydar Aliyev wanted to eliminate potential threats 
and pressures from Russia before the conclusion of an energy deal with western 
companies. Thus, as a part of the strategy of limited bandwagoning, Azerbaijan made 




After slightly improving Russian-Azerbaijani relations, President Aliyev revived 
cooperation with western corporations regarding the development and exploration of 
Azerbaijan’s oil fields. Initially, Russia was against any energy arrangements of 
Azerbaijan with western oil companies since it would increase the Western influence in 
the South Caucasus. Russia again used an issue of the unresolved status of the Caspian 
Sea as a leverage and trump card against Azerbaijan (MacDougall,1997, 94). Heydar 
Aliyev distributed ten percent out of shares of the State Oil Company to the Russian 
Lukoil company in order to acknowledge Russian interests and appease Russian pressures 
and threats (Bagirov 1996, 9). Thus, in September 1994, the government of Azerbaijan 
and a group of the biggest international oil corporations signed the “Contract of Century” 
to develop and explore Azeri– Chirag–Guneshli oil fields. It was a very significant 
contract not only because of huge profits that could be gained from oil reserves but also 
due to the fact that it established a basis for the future cooperation between Azerbaijan 
and Western countries (Bagirov 1996, 9). This accomplishment can be considered as a 
part of the strategy of denial of Russian dominance in the hedging policy of Azerbaijan. 
Skillful and sophisticated political maneuvering demonstrated by Azerbaijani authorities 
allowed this cooperation while mitigating risks and threats coming from Russia. 
Azerbaijan’s abundant energy resources and enhanced engagement with Western partners 
became vital policy tools in accomplishing Azerbaijan’s objectives of strengthening 
national security and developing autonomous foreign policy. Azerbaijan purposefully 
invited the largest oil companies from the largest countries with the objective to increase 
their interests and support to Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Ipek 2009, 
233). Thus, energy resources not only brought large investments in Azerbaijan and 
stimulated economic development but also allowed for increased security and 
independence of the country. 
As a part of dominance denial element of hedging strategy, Azerbaijan aimed to 
engage and enhance partnership in economic, political, and social spheres with various 
powers like Turkey, the EU, Iran, and the US. Modifications in Azerbaijan’s foreign 
policy framework were perceived with concerns among the Turkish political circles since 
there was a risk of deterioration of relations between the two countries (Nasibova, 2019). 
Thus, at the beginning of President Aliyev’s presidency, relations with Turkey were a bit 
cold and Aliyev’s policies aimed at improving relations with Russia were perceived 
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suspiciously among Turkish authorities (Ismailzade 2005, 4). In September 1993, the 
Turkish Foreign Minister paid a visit to Baku. During that meeting, President Aliyev 
emphasized that Turkey will be the main direction in the future export of oil from the 
Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli fields and that the Azerbaijani army will be trained by Turkish 
military experts as was agreed during Elchibey’s presidency (Yesevi & Tiftikcigil 2015, 
28). In September 1994, Heydar Aliyev and Suleyman Demirel signed “The Treaty on 
Friendship and Cooperation” during his visit to Ankara (Ibrahimov, 2011). 
Energy cooperation played a very significant role in transforming Azerbaijani-
Turkish relations to a completely new level of strategic partnership. The Contract of 
Century was a vital agreement in that sense. Turkish TPAO oil company gained 1.75 
percent of shares in that contract, which was later increased to 6.75 upon the Turkish 
request (Bagirov 1996, 11). This deal has paved the way for a number of subsequent huge 
projects and agreements in energy cooperation between two countries. Even though 
President Aliyev pursued pragmatic policies, he attached very significant meaning to 
Turkey in his foreign policy (Ismailzade 2005, 4).  
The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was one of the vital issues 
in Azerbaijani-Turkish cooperation. Since Azerbaijan is a landlocked country, there was 
a need for a route to transport oil to European markets that would bypass Russia from the 
deal. At the moment the only possible way to export Azerbaijani oil to Europe was 
through Novorossiysk and that route was not efficient and it was giving Russia leverage 
over Azerbaijan since at any moment Moscow could disrupt the process (Kim & Eom 
2008, 99-100). Thus in November 1999, an agreement regarding the construction of the 
BTC pipeline was signed by presidents of Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia (Suleymanov, 
Bulut & Rahmanov, 2017, p. 34). The construction works were finalized by 2005.  
Another huge project between two brotherly countries was an agreement 
regarding the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipeline that was signed 
in March 2001. The purpose of this project was to transport Azerbaijani natural gas from 
the Shah Deniz field to Western markets. This project was another step towards 
Azerbaijani strategic partnership with Turkey and the EU. Turkey played the role of 
transit country in energy cooperation and connection between Azerbaijan and the West. 
BTC and BTE pipelines were of utmost geopolitical importance for Turkey, Azerbaijan, 
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the US, and the EU. The Russian monopoly over the export routes from Central Asia and 
the Caucasus to European markets was eliminated with the construction of these pipelines 
(Nixey 2010, 129). Azerbaijan also managed to keep Armenia isolated in the region by 
taking them out of energy projects. 
3.2.3. Increased tensions with Russian Federation and Iran 
Despite President Aliyev’s attempts to pursue friendly relations with Russian 
authorities, there were tense issues that aggravated the relationship between the two 
countries. The Russo-Chechen war that started in 1994 after Russian forces invaded 
Chechnya was one of the central issues in Russo-Azerbaijani relations during this period. 
Azerbaijan was accused of aiding Chechen insurgents during the war by permitting them 
to use its territory as a transit route to supply military ammunition to rebel forces (Aslanli 
2010, 141). Even though Azerbaijani authorities officially refused accusations, Russia did 
not change its position by closing the borders with Azerbaijan and levying an economic 
embargo for three years (Aslanli 2010, 141). This was a very substantial punishment for 
Azerbaijan since around seventy percent of the country’s trade was with northern 
neighbors. The embargo was annulled only in 1996 after the Russo-Chechen war ended 
with the Khasavyurt Accords.   
The question of the status of the Caspian Sea was another controversial topic in 
Russo-Azerbaijani relations during this period. Russian authorities wanted to decrease 
territorial waters to a ten-mile zone so that huge reserves of oil would not be included 
there. Furthermore, they insisted that the principle of a condominium should be applied 
in the case of the Caspian which requires the joint use of Caspian resources (Haghayeghi 
2003, 33). Russia used this argument by referring to the treaties concluded between Iran 
and the Soviet Union in 1921 and 1940 (Haghayeghi 2003, 33). On the other hand, 
Azerbaijan was striving to realize the division of the Caspian Sea into national sectors 
along the median line.  
Another very significant issue that complicated the Russo-Azerbaijani 
relationship was military assistance by the Russian side to Armenia in 1997. Russia 
granted for free one billion dollars’ worth of military ammunition and weapons to the 
armed forces of the Republic of Armenia (Abilov & Isayev 2015, 126). After this event, 
Azerbaijan demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with Western countries and NATO 
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regarding security developments in the region. Heydar Aliyev very carefully employed 
the strategy of indirect balancing against Russia. Thus, Azerbaijan reacted to Russian 
actions by trying to get support from the West. This created concerns in Moscow since 
during those times there were speculations regarding Azerbaijan’s membership in NATO 
and the establishment of its military bases in Azerbaijan (Abilov & Isayev 2015, 126). 
The establishment of the alliance between Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, and 
Moldova (GUAM) was perceived as a balancing instrument against increased Russian 
influence in the post-Soviet space (Abushov 2009, 197). As a part of indirect balancing, 
Azerbaijan continued its security partnership with NATO. The foundation of 
Azerbaijan’s relations with NATO goes back to May 1994 when the Partnership for Peace 
Framework was signed between the parties. This framework enabled cooperation of 
Azerbaijan with NATO would cooperate in matters of security and defense industry and 
allowed Azerbaijan to take part in peace operations led by NATO forces (NATO website). 
Turkey was a very crucial actor in the establishment of Azerbaijani relations with Euro-
Atlantic structures. Turkish military experts were actively engaged in the training process 
of the Azerbaijani army for its adaptation to NATO standards as a part of the Partnership 
for Peace Framework (Oztarsu 2011, 8). In 1997, Azerbaijan started participating in the 
Planning and Review Process. Despite Russian pressures, Azerbaijan has participated in 
the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo under NATO-led forces from 1999 till 2008 
(Antonopoulos et al. 2017,374). 
Azerbaijan’s relations with Iran remained very complicated despite Heydar 
Aliyev’s attempts to normalize it after Elchibey’s presidency. Authorities of Iran were 
displeased and suspicious of Azerbaijan due to its increasing energy partnerships with 
Western countries and the growing influence of the US in the South Caucasus. Moreover, 
Azerbaijan’s engagement with Euro-Atlantic military structures, participation in NATO-
led peacekeeping operations were additional annoying issues for Iran (Geybulla 2018, 
106). An accumulated mutual distrust between Azerbaijan and Iran was an impeding 
factor in the normalization of bilateral relations and development of mutually beneficial 
projects (Ismailzade, 2016).  
The worst period in Azerbaijani-Iranian relations started during the confrontation 
in the disputed Alov oil field. Due to the unresolved status of the Caspian Sea, both 
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countries claimed that the Alov field belongs to their respective sector of the Caspian 
basin. During the exploration conducted by BP’s research vessels, Iranian warships 
forced them to stop the exploration works. Right after this incident, Iran’s two jet fighters 
several times crossed Azerbaijan’s airspace sending a very severe warning (Ismailzade, 
2016). During these tensions, Turkey supported Azerbaijan by making several foreign 
policy decisions. The Turkish general visited Baku and Turkey sent a message to Iran by 
performing a demonstration of its military jets in Baku. Turkish involvement did not 
allow this incident to further escalate into a military conflict between Baku and Tehran 
(Ismailzade, 2016).  
3.2.4. Negotiation process over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
The Nagorno-Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia was ended by the 
1994 ceasefire brokered by the Russian Federation. As a result of the war, Azerbaijan lost 
twenty percent of its internationally recognized territories. Moreover, Azerbaijan got 
more than 700 thousand refugees or internally displaced people. The results of this war 
have shaped Azerbaijan’s subsequent security policy since its fundamental principle was 
based on the restoration of territorial integrity.  
The OSCE Minsk Group has been involved in the conflict resolution process since 
1992. In 1996, the OSCE Minsk Group proposed a "package solution" to the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. The proposal aimed to deal with the major issues and accommodate 
the interests of both parties. According to the package solution, Azerbaijan’s territorial 
integrity should be maintained while ensuring “the broadest possible self-rule for 
Nagorno Karabakh” (Hopmann, 2014, p. 169). Furthermore, this solution demanded the 
removal of Armenian forces from the seven adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh districts of 
Azerbaijan, the return of internally displaced people to their homes, and the unconstrained 
connection between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh (Hopmann, 2014, p. 169). The 
package solution was proposed to Azerbaijan and Armenia during the OSCE Lisbon 
Summit. Azerbaijani authorities supported the proposed package. At the same time, 
Azerbaijani authorities added that the proposed self-rule for Nagorno-Karabakh should 
not permit the possession of its private army and currency (Hopmann, 2014, p. 22). 
Armenian authorities opposed the proposed framework insisting that it was detrimental 
to negotiations (Hopmann, 2014, p. 22).  
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In 1997, the Minsk Group proposed a “step-by-step” solution to the conflict. In 
the first stage, Armenian military forces were required to withdraw from six out of seven 
districts surrounding the Nagorno-Karabakh, the return of Azerbaijani IDPs to six 
districts, and the opening of communication links (Hopmann, 2014, p. 23). The next stage 
encompasses the negotiations on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the return of Lachin 
district to Azerbaijan, and “the return of Azerbaijani IDPs to Nagorno-Karabakh” 
(Hopmann, 2014, p. 23). Both parties to the conflict initially endorsed a “step-by-step” 
solution. However, the “Nagorno-Karabakh leadership” strongly opposed this solution 
and claimed that “the final Status of Nagorno-Karabakh should be achieved before the 
withdrawal of occupying forces from the region” (Abilov, 2018, p. 149). Thus, due to 
pressures from Nagorno-Karabakh, this solution was also rejected by Armenia. 
3.2.5. New president- new attitude  
Heydar Aliyev was eager to stimulate cooperation and trust with Russia by visiting 
Moscow seven times during his presidency period till 2003. However, President Yeltsin 
did not follow the reciprocity principle by making an official or working visit to 
Azerbaijan (Valiyev & Mamishova 2019, 7). Bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and 
Russia experienced positive modifications underlined by several mutual visits by heads 
of states after Vladimir Putin became the President of the Russian Federation in 2000. 
These modifications were supposedly caused by good personal relations between 
presidents who had a common background of working in KGB (Valiyev & Mamishova 
2019, 5). With the purpose of bringing Azerbaijan back to Russia’s sphere of influence, 
Putin started more actively engaging with its southern neighbor unlike his predecessor, 
and made an official visit to Baku in January 2001 (Valiyev & Mamishova 2019, 5). It 
was the first visit of the Russian president to Azerbaijan since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. During that meeting, Azerbaijani and Russian authorities managed to achieve a 
compromise regarding the use of natural resources of the Caspian Sea.  According to the 
agreement by the parties, coastal states have an exclusive right to explore natural 
resources and conduct economic activities in their respective zones.  
During President Aliyev’s visit to Russia in January 2002, two republics 
concluded an agreement regarding the lease of the Gabala radar station. The station was 
originally constructed by the Soviet Union in 1985 with the purpose of detecting missile 
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launches (Ismailova, 2002). In accordance with the 2002 agreement, the radar station was 
recognized as Azerbaijan’s facility, and Russia was permitted to lease it for 10 years. One 
of the primary reasons for Russian authorities to maintain this radar station was to 
preserve a military presence in Azerbaijan since it was the only country of the South 
Caucasus where Russia did not have a military presence (Valiyev & Mamishova 2019,9). 
Therefore, the Gabala radar station had geopolitical importance for Russian authorities. 
3.2.6. Conclusion 
Heydar Aliyev pursued a hedging strategy in his relations with external powers. 
This strategy allowed Azerbaijan to reduce threats and risks to national security by closely 
engaging with Russia and simultaneously to avoid foregoing close and mutually 
beneficial cooperation with other important actors in the region such as the US, the EU, 
and Turkey. During the timeframe of Heydar Aliyev’s presidency from October 1993 to 
October 2003, Baku utilized a wide range of tools in its hedging policy such as economic 
pragmatism, indirect balancing, limited bandwagoning, binding engagement, and 
dominance denial. 
3.3. Azerbaijan’s security strategy during Ilham Aliyev’s presidency (2003-Present) 
3.3.1. Introduction 
After being elected as the president of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev 
continued his father’s foreign policy framework and tended to balance the influences of 
various external actors while promoting national interests. Despite several proposals from 
the OSCE Minsk Group, there was no progress in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. Ilham Aliyev continued the implementation of a hedging strategy by using the 
same mixed policies. Partnerships established with numerous actors were based solely on 
Azerbaijan’s national interests. Gigantic projects such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-
Tbilisi-Erzurum, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars, TANAP, TAP have been implemented during this 
period and were parts of the dominance-denial strategy. These crucial projects were 
detrimental to Russian interests and were implemented under very high pressures and 
threats coming from Russia.  But since these projects were based on Azerbaijan’s national 
interests, Baku did not make any concessions to Russia in these matters. Thus, the above-
mentioned projects significantly improved Azerbaijan’s geostrategic position making it a 
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transportation and energy hub between the East and West, considerably increased Baku’s 
political autonomy in foreign affairs, and enhanced overall prestige and standing on the 
international stage. Azerbaijan’s increased strategic partnership with various regional 
powers such as the EU, the US, Turkey, Iran, and China are all part of the dominance 
denial strategy and aim to decrease dependence on Russia to a minimum. The key regional 
and international transportation projects such as TRACECA, North-South Transport 
Corridor, and the New Silk Road pass through the territory of Azerbaijan. Cooperation 
with NATO and participation in NATO-led peacekeeping operations increased during the 
presidency of Ilham Aliyev and constituted the indirect balancing strategy against Russia. 
However, the elements of limited bandwagoning are also present in Baku’s security 
strategy since Azerbaijani authorities still remained very attentive and did not directly 
challenge Russia by trying to integrate into either NATO or the EU. Azerbaijan increased 
its cooperation with Russia and participated jointly in big projects like the North-South 
railway. Elements of economic pragmatism can also be easily observable since Russia is 
the second-largest trading partner of Azerbaijan and Baku tries to maximize its profits 
from economic cooperation. 
3.3.2. 2003-2008: A period of increased engagement with the West 
During the first term of Ilham Aliyev’s presidency, Azerbaijan established a 
partnership with the EU on the basis of various regional projects. Transportation projects 
and energy projects were vital in the development of bilateral relations between parties 
(Valiyev 2017, 33). Energy relations with the EU were established after the BTC pipeline 
became operational in June 206. Furthermore, in November 2006, Azerbaijan and the EU 
signed a memorandum on the strategic partnership in the energy field. The main goal of 
this memorandum was to safeguard the EU’s energy security and diversify the supply of 
energy resources through the export of energy resources from the Caspian basin to 
European markets (Jamalov & Alizada 2015, 7). Thus, this document established grounds 
for Azerbaijan’s role both as an exporter of and transit for the supply of energy to the EU 
countries. 
Azerbaijan’s relationship with the EU deepened more after becoming part of the 
European Neighborhood Policy in 2004. After the adoption of the Action Plan by the 
European Union and Azerbaijan in 2006, the parties started cooperation in various spheres 
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such as the democratization of Azerbaijani society, sustainable economic development, 
as well as energy cooperation (Matzigkeit, 2016). The financial assistance of the 
European Union was not a major issue for Azerbaijani authorities. The Azerbaijani side 
was more interested in EU mediation on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
(Matzigkeit, 2016). 
In 2004, Azerbaijan expanded its partnership with NATO by joining the 
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). The IPAP demonstrated Azerbaijan’s 
willingness to cooperate with Euro-Atlantic structures on various issues such as security 
sector reforms, enhancing military to NATO standards, and so on. The increased 
investment of the US companies in Azerbaijan’s energy projects and Baku’s active 
involvement in the war against terrorism further intensified the bilateral relations 
(MacDougal 2009, 263). Additionally, despite external pressures coming from Russia and 
Iran, Azerbaijan continued its contribution to the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan 
by sending its peacekeeping forces and by being a reliable transit country (Garibov 2015, 
31).  
At the beginning of Ilham Aliyev’s presidency, tensions in relations with Turkey 
that were present since Erdogan’s party came to power still continued. One of the 
contradictory issues was the recognition of the Republic of Northern Cyprus. 
Azerbaijan’s major concern regarding this issue was that Azerbaijan’s recognition of a 
Northern Cyprus would set a precedent in the future for the case of Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Azerbaijan was unwilling to vote for the formation of Northern Cyprus’s representation 
at the Council of Europe (Ismailzade 2005, 8). Azerbaijani diplomats missed the voting 
on this issue during the 2004 session of the Parliamentary Assembly in Strasburg. After 
the bill was rejected, Turkish politicians blamed Azerbaijan for not supporting Turkey on 
this issue (Ismailzade 2005, 9). However, the trilateral cooperation of Azerbaijan, Turkey, 
and Georgia continued in 2005 with the agreement signed between respective countries 
on the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway which would connect three countries 
(Celikpala & Veliyev 2015, 16). This is a very important part of the transport corridor 
linking Europe and Asia, the construction of which has been finalized in 2017. Due to the 
fact that Armenia was not included in the project and it was viewed as an effort of 
Azerbaijan to isolate Armenia from regional projects, the US Congress prevented the 
financial support for this project under the pressure of the Armenian Diaspora. 
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Consequently, the financial burden of the project was taken by the parties of the 
agreement (Celikpala & Veliyev 2015, 17). 
From the beginning of his tenure, Ilham Aliyev acknowledged the crucial 
importance of developing friendly relations with his northern neighbor (MacDougall 
2009, 255). In February 2004, there was an official visit of President Aliyev to Moscow.  
Azerbaijan’s interests in developing economic relations and increasing trade turnover 
with neighboring countries coincided with Russian plans. After the reciprocal visit of 
Vladimir Putin to Baku in 2006, trade and economic issues gained crucial importance in 
bilateral cooperation between states (Cornell 2011, 352). Azerbaijan actively participated 
in the project of the International North-South Transport Corridor that would reduce 
transport costs and increase trade volumes in bilateral relations of countries involved. 
Transport corridors take fundamental importance in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy because 
it considerably improves the geostrategic position of Azerbaijan, stimulates trade 
relations and the development of the economy (Cornell 2011, 352). 
Iran was a source of threat to Azerbaijan’s security during this period. Following 
the events of the Alov oil field, Azerbaijan closed a large proportion of Shiite religious 
schools operating on its territory, which were funded by Iran (Cohen 2012, 70). Baku has 
taken preventive measures to tackle the problem of radical groups supported and funded 
by Iranian authorities. These radical Shiites that mainly operate in southern parts of 
Azerbaijan cause a threat to the internal security of the state. Iran was blamed several 
times for the interference in Azerbaijan’s internal issues. In 2007, several citizens of Iran 
were imprisoned for espionage activities in Azerbaijan and for an attempt to incite 
rebellion (Cutler 2012, 348). Moreover, a year later, Azerbaijan prevented a terrorist 
attack on the Embassy of Israel in Baku organized by Hezbollah agents with the support 
of Iranian intelligence (Cohen 2012, 70).  
In November 2007, during the OSCE conference in Madrid, the Minsk Group 
proposed a new framework for the negotiations of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The 
framework included “the phased withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijani 
territories contiguous to Nagorno-Karabakh”, the demilitarization of these seven districts, 
arrangement of international peacekeepers, necessary measures to ensure the safe return 
of IDPs to their homes, and “a referendum among the Nagorno-Karabakh population to 
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determine the region’s future status” (Abilov, 2018, p. 154). Although both parties 
supported some of the principles, the main point of the impasse was the question of the 
status of Nagorno-Karabakh (Abilov, 2018, p. 154).   
3.3.3. 2008-2014: New geopolitical realities  
During the second term of Ilham Aliyev’s presidency, several important events 
such as the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, an attempt of a reconciliation between Turkey 
and Armenia, and certain shifts in the US interests in regard to South Caucasus induced 
Azerbaijani authorities to reconsider certain patterns in state’s foreign policy. Russian 
aggression against pro-Western Georgia and its recognition of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia as independent states was a shocking event for Azerbaijani political circles and 
the overall population (Cutler 2020, 40). As a result of the war, Russia demonstrated itself 
as the only and undisputable power in the region. By failing to appropriately react to the 
Russian aggression against the pro-Western country, the United States demonstrated its 
lack of ability to counter Russia and protect its allies in the South Caucasus (Cornell, 
2011, p. 353; Cutler 2020, 40). Furthermore, Azerbaijan’s perception of the Western 
countries as credible partners to deter Russian offensive actions was shattered (Goble, 
2008).  
During the period of Armenian-Turkish rapprochement, Azerbaijani-Turkish 
relations experienced the highest deterioration in recent history (Nichol 2013, 19). The 
rapprochement process has started after the President of Turkey Abdullah Gul visited 
Yerevan in September 2008 after the invitation from the Armenian counterpart to attend 
a football match between Turkey and Armenia within World Cup qualifications. This 
event has been subsequently framed as “football diplomacy”. In October 2009, Turkey 
and Armenia signed two very important documents: the “Protocol on the establishment 
of diplomatic relations” and the “Protocol on the development of bilateral relations” 
(Nichol 2013, 19). Azerbaijan perceived the reconciliation process between Armenia and 
Turkey as a betrayal from a fraternal state since it was agreed that Turkey would not 
cooperate and normalize relations with Armenia unless the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is 
solved (Torbakov 2010, 35).  
Ilham Aliyev severely responded to the reconciliation process by intimidating the 
sale of natural gas to Turkey by market prices. Under the agreement of 2002, Azerbaijan’s 
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gas was sold to Turkey at the price of $120 per thousand cubic meters, which is three 
times less than market prices (Mikhelidze 2010, 4). Moreover, Azerbaijani authorities 
demonstrated that if Baku’s interests would be ignored, Azerbaijan could start 
negotiations with Russia regarding the participation in Russian led energy projects instead 
of the Nabucco project (Blank 2013, 46). In October 2009, Azerbaijan signed a contract 
with Russia on the export of its natural gas to Russian markets, but from the gas fields of 
the State Oil Company. This energy partnership was perceived as a signal that Russia is 
an alternative transit country for the export of Azerbaijani natural resources to European 
markets (Mikhelidze 2010, 7). Thus, Azerbaijani authorities demonstrated that if the 
agreement with Armenia would not include a condition regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Turkey would incur significant losses. These measures were effective since Turkey 
included a precondition to the deal that Armenia’s military should end the occupation of 
Azerbaijani territories. Armenia did not accept this precondition and protocols signed in 
2009 were not ratified. Deterioration of Azerbaijani-Turkish relations has ended and both 
parties continued their cooperation in all spheres of life, especially in upcoming huge 
energy projects.  
During this period, the diplomatic relations of Azerbaijan with the US deteriorated 
due to the latter’s participation in and persistence on the rapprochement between Turkey 
and Armenia instead of participating more actively in the solution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijani authorities perceived this as a biased approach that 
favored Armenia (Nichol 2013, 20). The cancellation of the US-Azerbaijani military 
training by Ilham Aliyev in 2010 was perceived as a reaction to these events (Nichol 
2013, 20). 
After the Russia-Georgian war and the deterioration of Azerbaijan’s relations with 
the US and Turkey, Azerbaijan started to engage more with the Russian Federation in 
various areas of interest. During the visit of President Medvedev to Baku in 2008, 
presidents signed a declaration on strategic partnership (Valiyev & Mamishova 2019, 12). 
In 2009, President Medvedev again visited Baku and an agreement was reached according 
to which Azerbaijan provided the North Caucasus region of Russia with natural gas 
(Nichol 2013, 18). However, it should be mentioned that Azerbaijan continued to engage 
with Russia only in matters of its own national interests. Both sides benefit from this 
partnership: Russia guarantees the supply of natural gas to the North Caucasus; 
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Azerbaijan, in its turn, trades its gas at market price (Valiyev 2011, 142). Mutually 
beneficial economic partnership with Russia demonstrates “an element of economic 
pragmatism in Azerbaijan’s hedging strategy towards Russia” (Valiyev & Mamishova 
2019, 13). In 2010, the collaboration between Azerbaijan and Russia grew to a new level 
after the signing of bilateral agreements on the demarcation of state borders and the rise 
of the natural gas volume exported to southern regions of Russia. Furthermore, by 2011 
Russia turned to be the largest supplier of military equipment to Azerbaijan (Garibov 
2015, 31). The rising cooperation with Russia in various spheres reflects the limited 
bandwagoning element of Azerbaijan’s diplomacy.  
After two years of tensions in Ankara-Baku relations, the two countries 
significantly intensified their military cooperation. In 2010, Azerbaijan and Turkey 
signed the Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support Agreement. According to this 
agreement, in case of aggression against one of the parties, the other one will support it 
by taking all necessary measures (Abbasov, 2011). The agreement also encompasses joint 
military exercises. The deepening of military relations with Ankara was perceived as a 
response to the Russo-Georgian war. This agreement reflects s a limited balancing 
element of Azerbaijan’s hedging strategy.  
In 2011, Azerbaijan became a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). It 
was a continuation of the longstanding multi-vector foreign policy and an obvious signal 
to the major global powers that Azerbaijan will not become a member of any military 
coalition (Strakes 2015, 4). Moreover, Azerbaijan was elected as a non-permanent 
member of the UN Security Council for the period of 2012-2013 and this substantially 
increases the international prestige of Baku (Jafarova, 2020). 
The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline made Azerbaijan a part of the European 
gas network. In 2012, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed an agreement in Izmir regarding the 
implementation of the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) (Bilgin 2012, 
311). The construction of TANAP was another huge project in the strategic partnership 
of Azerbaijan with Turkey and the EU. As a result of the TANAP project and planned 
Trans-Caspian pipeline, Azerbaijan would become both a supplier of gas and a transit 
country through which large volumes of Caspian gas would reach European markets 
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(Blank 2013, 16). However, this project produced tensions between Azerbaijan and 
Russia due to the fact that TANAP was challenging Moscow’s South Stream project.  
In June 2013, a decision was made to build the Trans Adriatic gas pipeline, which 
is part of the Southern Gas Corridor project by which Azerbaijani gas from the Shah 
Deniz 2 field will flow to European consumers. This was the turning point in the energy 
dialogue between the EU and Azerbaijan (Kusters, 2017, p. 38). By connecting the 
Turkish-Greece border with Italy, it would finally enable the complete energy route 
starting from Shahdeniz 2 field. This project had substantial strategic importance to all 
parties since it allowed Azerbaijan to diversify its export routes, for Turkey and Europe 
to decrease dependence on Russia by expanding supply routes of natural gas. 
Azerbaijan continued its engagement with the EU by joining Eastern Partnership 
in 2009. One of the central motives for Azerbaijan's participation in the EaP was an 
attempt to make progress in the resolution of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Nevertheless, the EU was more interested in energy cooperation and the democratization 
process in Azerbaijan, and did not demonstrate active interest in the resolution of the 
conflict. Thus, Azerbaijan and the EU pursued different goals in the partnership. 
European integration was not the major goal in Azerbaijan in its engagement with western 
partners (Gurbanov, 2018). Baku continued its hedging policy by engaging with various 
partners and without confronting Russian interests. Economic and energy cooperation 
were major mutual points of interest between the EU and Azerbaijan. In 2013, Azerbaijan 
refused from signing the Association Agreement, instead suggesting a separate strategic 
partnership agreement based on mutual interests. 
Along with the decision on the TANAP project, there was another issue in which 
Azerbaijan stood contrary to Russian interests. In 2012, Azerbaijan demonstrated its 
unwillingness to make concessions to Russia in negotiations over the extension of the 
lease of the Gabala radar station. This station was important for Russia for the 
maintenance of its presence in Azerbaijan. Originally, the annual lease of this station was 
7 million dollars (Fuller 2013, 6). However, during the negotiations, Azerbaijan asserted 
that it wants compensation for the negative impact the station has on Azerbaijan’s tourism 
industry and environment (Valiyev 2013). Azerbaijan decided to increase the cost of the 
station so much that Russia would reject the claim and refuse from extending the deal. 
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Thus, Azerbaijan firstly increased the price to 15 million dollars, then to 150 million, and 
finally to 300 million dollars, and Russia rejected the deal (Fuller 2013, 6). 
During these times, Moscow was promoting the idea of an alternative integration 
project: Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Despite considerable pressures, Azerbaijani 
authorities did not perceive this project as beneficial for Baku but simultaneously did not 
want to spoil relations with Moscow (Kempe 2013, 4). The EEU was seen as an 
instrument for promoting Russian geopolitical interests and the continuation of Russian 
dominance in the Post-Soviet space (Bayramov 2013, 15).  
3.3.4. 2014-2020: Ukrainian crisis and the period of Western disengagement  
After Crimea’s annexation, Azerbaijan has been very cautious in its engagement 
with Western countries in order to avoid confrontation with Russia which still has 
leverage over Baku. Moscow reacted very aggressively to Ukraine’s attempts to integrate 
with the EU within the framework of the Eastern Partnership.  Russia sent a clear message 
to all CIS countries that it would not tolerate the EU’s eastward enlargement and would 
employ all the means necessary to maintain its geopolitical interests and keep the Post-
Soviet space as a Russian sphere of influence. In regards to Azerbaijan, Russia continued 
using the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as its major source of leverage on Baku in order to 
guarantee that similar events would not happen there (Guliyev, 2014). 
Azerbaijan faced new challenges after the occupation of Crimea also because 
official Baku needed to be very careful in its position and statements regarding the 
conflict in order to avoid irritating its northern neighbor. Azerbaijan totally supported 
Ukraine’s territorial integrity by voting in favor of the resolution in the UN General 
Assembly. Azerbaijan along with Georgia and Moldova were the only CIS members that 
supported the resolution (Abbasov 2014, 13). This is because the Russian leverage over 
Baku is not as high as in cases of most CIS countries. At the same time, Baku refrained 
from officially condemning the annexation of Crimea in its statements (Guliyev, 2014).  
After the Ukrainian crisis, there was a period of US disengagement in the region 
which still continues during the presidency of Donald Trump. Faced with new realities, 
Azerbaijan was especially cautious in its relations with Russia and tried to buy Russian 
support through continuous cooperation in the arms trade. Over the period from 2013 to 
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2017, Azerbaijan has purchased military equipment from Russia worth $3.35 billion, 
accounting for 65 percent of Azerbaijan's total military purchases (Aliyev, 2018; Valiyev 
2017, 135).  
In 2013, Chinese authorities declared their plans regarding the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) that aims to expand connectivity and partnership between countries of 
Europe and Asia by restoring the ancient Silk Road. Azerbaijan, which for years initiated 
and implemented transportation and energy projects to connect Europe and Asia, very 
positively viewed the Chinese-led project. Up until this moment, China was only 
passively involved in the South Caucasus due to geographical restrictions. In 2015, during 
the visit of Ilham Aliyev to Beijing, Azerbaijan joined the BRI by signing a Memorandum 
of Understanding on Joint Encouragement of the Establishment of the Silk Way 
Economic Belt (Azertag 2019). During the visit, President Aliyev repeatedly mentioned 
the importance of cooperation with China in the transportation sector and the role Baku-
Tbilisi-Kars railway, which is the shortest route for trade between Europe and China, in 
supporting the BRI project (Azertag 2019). Azerbaijan’s increased role as a transportation 
hub was expected to increase Chinese investments. China was highly interested in 
cooperation because of Azerbaijan’s strategic location and since Baku has the necessary 
capacity to contribute to the BRI in terms of financial power and developed transport 
routes (Babayev & Ismailzade 2020, 5). 
During that time, the cooperation with Beijing was important for Baku not only 
for economic but also for political reasons since Azerbaijan was directly looking for new 
global power to fill the power vacuum established after the gradual EU and US 
disengagement in the region (Valiyev 2016). However, Azerbaijani elites gradually 
comprehended that Beijing “does not have political interests in the region, due to its 
geographical distance” (Valiyev 2016). 
The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line was finally completed in October 2017 despite 
massive Russian pressures, economic challenges of the project, and instability in the 
region. The BTK project was developed without the financial backing of international 
donors due to leaving Armenia out of the project for political reasons. Azerbaijan 
demonstrated its determination and took the major share of responsibility to accomplish 
this project. The BTK project is evidence that a small state can initiate and play a crucial 
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role in huge regional and global projects without the help of the international community 
(Abdullayev, 2017).  
From a geopolitical view, the key importance of the BTK is that it will end very 
long-term Russian supremacy over land transportation between Europe and Asia (Howard 
2012, 353). Moreover, Russian control over railway links across the Caucasus will also 
come to end. “For nearly a century, Kremlin planners developed the Caucasus railway 
network along a North-South axis, aimed at integrating Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan 
into a Russian/Soviet economic sphere of influence” (Howard 2012, 353). Thus, the BTK 
project demonstrates that Azerbaijan plans to enhance its economic relations with 
countries along the East-West line without integrating into Russian-led projects. This 
project fits into elements of economic pragmatism and dominance denial of Azerbaijan’s 
hedging policy. Azerbaijan continues to diversify its partners in various spheres and 
challenges the Russian dominance over railway networks.  
Relations with Iran considerably normalized during the last years since the sides 
found a common agreement regarding the disputed oil fields in the Caspian basin and 
decided to develop fields and extract resources together in these areas. In 2018, the 
Convention on the Caspian Sea’s Legal Status was signed between respective coastal 
states (Gurbanov, 2018). This agreement served mainly Iranian and Russian interests 
because it did not allow the presence of armed forces of non-coastal states in the Caspian 
Sea (Rahimov, 2019). Nevertheless, the most contentious issues regarding the 
demarcation of national zones and the development of pipelines were still unresolved.   
3.4. Conclusion 
The chapter examined Azerbaijan’s security policies since the proclamation of 
independence. During the presidency of Ayaz Mutallibov, Azerbaijan pursued a 
bandwagoning strategy by complying with Russian demands and striving to integrate into 
Russian-led projects. President Elchibey followed a balancing strategy against Russia by 
seeking a pro-Turkish and pro-Western foreign policy. During his presidency, Azerbaijan 
wanted to move away from Russian influence and thus did not make any concessions in 
regards to Russian demands. Both strategies under the Mutallibov and Elchibey 
presidencies failed due to domestic and geopolitical factors respectively. Heydar Aliyev 
took into consideration domestic and geopolitical factors and chose to follow a hedging 
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strategy in relation to external powers. Hedging strategy allowed Azerbaijan to decrease 
threats to state security by maintaining a close partnership with Russia and simultaneously 
pursuing a relatively independent foreign policy with other regional powers as well. 
Abundant natural resources and a favorable geostrategic position contributed to the 
effectiveness of this strategy in Azerbaijan’s case. Ilham Aliyev continued hedging 
strategy that enabled Azerbaijan to maintain mutually beneficial energy, economic, 
security partnerships with numerous regional actors while not confronting the northern 
neighbor. Azerbaijan’s influence in the international arena considerably increased over 




















4. The Tovuz Clashes: Prelude, Development and Reactions.  
On July 12, 2020, there was a confrontation between Azerbaijani and Armenian 
forces along the border between the Tovuz region of Azerbaijan and the Tavush region 
of Armenia. During this incident, the sides of the conflict actively used heavy artillery 
attacks, tanks, and drones causing casualties and property destruction. During the July 
events, the Azerbaijani public made it clear that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should 
be solved soon. Tens of thousands of people took to the streets demanding mobilization 
and the beginning of military operations in Karabakh (BBC, July 15). Azerbaijani elites 
recognized that the status quo is not acceptable for the domestic audience.  
There have been numerous discussions on the sources of this confrontation and 
who was interested in the escalation of the conflict on the border between the two 
countries. Since the research is about the influence of the Tovuz incident on Azerbaijan’s 
security strategy, only Baku’s perception of the clashes would be discussed. The 
escalation of hostilities between two states would be discussed in the context of a series 
of events in the region that were perceived as provocative by Azerbaijan. After Nikol 
Pashinyan came to power in Armenia as a result of the Velvet Revolution, the peace 
negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia reached a deadlock position. There was no 
progress in the peace process and Armenia’s new Prime Minister’s actions demonstrated 
deviance from the format of negotiations. 
4.1. Azerbaijan’s perception of Armenia’s moves prior to the clashes  
In August 2019, during his visit to Khankendi, Nikol Pashinyan made a statement 
that was very provocative for Baku by declaring that Nagorno Karabakh is Armenia. It 
was very harsh rhetoric due to the fact that it was completely inconsistent with the overall 
negotiation format and specifically with regards to Armenia’s official position on the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Despite Armenia’s insistence on the principle of self-
determination in the resolution of the conflict and the independence of an unrecognized 
republic, Pashinyan contradicted the official position that Armenia for years has been 
putting on the negotiation table. This statement was a declaration that Nagorno-Karabakh 
was actually a part of Armenia, not a separate republic that strives to get recognition 
(Cutler, 2020). Nikol Pashinyan was the first Armenian politician that made such a 
contradictory claim since the first Karabakh war (Cutler, 2020). Despite the international 
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recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh as an integral part of Azerbaijan, Armenian 
authorities for years have been arguing regarding the right to self-determination and have 
been trying to prove that Nagorno-Karabakh is an independent republic and is not 
controlled by the Republic of Armenia itself. However, in the prominent case of Chiragov 
vs Armenia, the European Court of Human Rights made a decision in 2015 that the 
Republic of Armenia exerts effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh. This court 
decision meant that it is not an internal administration of an unrecognized entity that 
controls the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, but the republic of Armenia itself (Cutler, 
2020). Actually, the decision of the European Court of Human Rights is in line with 
Pashinyan’s statement and contradicts Armenia’s official position on the conflict. 
Pashinyan’s statement was very negatively perceived in Baku since it completely wasted 
all negotiation efforts that have been taken throughout 27 years of dialogues. It was a 
clear indication that Pashinyan abandoned the OSCE’s Madrid Principles. Hikmat 
Hajiyev, the assistant to the president of Azerbaijan, said: “the final nail in the coffin of 
the negotiation process was when he said that Nagorno-Karabakh was Armenian” (Gall, 
2020). The rejection of the Madrid Principles was further confirmed when the Armenian 
Premier Minister proposed to President Aliyev new conditions for the continuation of 
peace negotiations. He was attempting to modify the format of negotiations by inviting 
the members of Nagorno Karabakh’s local administration to the negotiation table. 
Azerbaijan considered this step as detrimental to the negotiation process since Baku does 
not accept the separatist regime as a party to the conflict.  
Another act that was provocatively perceived in Baku was the inauguration of a 
new ‘president’ of the unrecognized republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. In late March of 
2020, there were parliamentary and presidential elections held in the occupied regions of 
Azerbaijan. Later, Armenia’s Prime Minister took part in the inauguration ceremony 
which was held in Shusha city which is a cultural center of Azerbaijan and has a very 
deep emotional significance for Azerbaijanis (Huseynov & Muradov, 2020). Moreover, 
Pashinyan was suggesting to move the parliament of the unrecognized republic to Shusha. 
Another provocatively perceived action was the announcement of the construction of a 
road from Armenia to Jabrayil city which is one of seven regions adjacent to Nagorno-
Karabakh (Kucera, 2019). Under the basic principles of negotiations, these seven adjacent 
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regions were supposed to be given back to Azerbaijan. It was another clear indication that 
Armenia is not willing to make concessions and is abandoning the Madrid Principles.  
Another provocatively perceived episode happened when Armenia’s Minister of 
Defense David Tonoyan adopted a new military doctrine. During his visit to the US in 
2019, Tonoyan proclaimed that Armenia would change the old format: instead of holding 
the defensive position of returning back Azerbaijan’s seven districts in exchange for 
peace, Armenia would pursue a new doctrine of ‘new war in exchange for new territories’ 
(Abrahamyan, 2020). This statement was perceived as a clear threat to Azerbaijan’s 
territorial integrity in addition to the already occupied territories.  Armenia's new military 
doctrine demonstrated increasingly rising militaristic sentiment among new government 
circles in Armenia. It also demonstrated that new military provocations might happen 
with the intention of the Armenian side to expand the conflict zone by including new 
territories from the Republic of Azerbaijan (V. Huseynov, personal communication, 
December 24, 2020). “Because of all these reasons, Azerbaijan was on high alert for the 
potential confrontation” (V. Huseynov, personal communication, December 24, 2020). 
The new doctrine precisely targeted the Azerbaijani state border, it was actually targeting 
not only Tovuz but also beyond that (T. Gafarli, personal communication, December 25, 
2020). 
4.2. Overview of the Tovuz skirmishes 
On July 12, 2020, the fighting between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces broke 
out. The military forces of the two countries confronted each other along the international 
borderline between the Tovuz province of Azerbaijan and the Tavush province of 
Armenia. The two countries accused each other of initiating the conflict along the border. 
Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense spread the news about an attempted attack by Armenian 
groups to seize positions in the direction of the Tovuz region (Mod.gov.az, July 12). The 
Ministry announced that Armenia used an artillery attack and Azerbaijani military forces 
have taken necessary measures to repulse the intervention attempt. Furthermore, it was 
announced that as a result of this attack two Azerbaijani soldiers were killed and five 
soldiers were injured (Mod.gov.az, July 12). Later that day, Azerbaijan reported the death 
of one of the wounded soldiers. The Ministry of Defense of Armenia, in turn, accused the 
Azerbaijani side of an attempt by Azerbaijani military forces to cross the state border in 
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a UAZ car (Twitter.com/ArmeniaMODTeam, July 12). After warnings by the Armenian 
side, Azerbaijani servicemen left the car and moved back to their positions 
(Twitter.com/ArmeniaMODTeam, July 12). Furthermore, the Armenian Ministry 
claimed that Azerbaijani forces tried to seize a position in the direction of the Tavush 
region by using artillery attacks.  
Azerbaijani side accused Armenian authorities of deceiving their population by 
not revealing the real number of casualties. On July 13, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense 
shared a video and stated that Armenia’s “firing positions, a radar station of the 
reconnaissance unit, the storage for military vehicles, tank, armored personnel carrier, 
more than 20 servicemen, the headquarters of the battalion and military infrastructure 
were destroyed” (Mod.gov.az, July 13). Moreover, it was noted that Armenia continues 
hiding the real losses from its public. Armenia’s Ministry of Defense refuted these reports. 
On July 14, Armenia’s military officials confirmed the death of four military personnel 
(Elliott, 2020). Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense reported the death of seven soldiers 
including the Major General (Sevencan, 2020).  
Both parties to the conflict accused each other of targeting civilian settlements. 
According to Armenian sources, on July 13, Azerbaijani forces fired projectiles from 82 
mm and 120 mm caliber mortars on civilian settlements in Chinari village of Tavush 
province (Stepanyan, 2020). One of the projectiles damaged the roof of one house in that 
village, however, there were no casualties (Stepanyan, 2020). The representative of 
Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense denied these claims by noting that Azerbaijani forces 
do not target the civilian population (Report Information Agency, July 13). Furthermore, 
the Azerbaijani side stated that on the same day “Armenian armed forces fired on Aghdam 
and Dondar Gushchu villages of Tovuz region with 120 mm mortars and D-30 howitzers” 
(Azertac, July 13). Several houses in Dondar Gushchu village were severely damaged, 
but there were no casualties (Azertac, July 13).  Azertac news agency shared images of 
the damaged houses and destroyed properties. On July 14, the Azerbaijani Ministry of 
Defense shared news claiming that Armenian forces fired at Agdam and Alibeyli villages 
of the Tovuz region from “large-caliber guns and artillery” (Trend News Agency, July 
14). As a result of the attacks, several houses of residents of Dondar Gushchu village were 
damaged (Trend News Agency, July 14). Moreover, it was reported that a 76 years old 
resident of Aghdam village was killed by artillery fire (Trend News Agency, July 14). 
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The Armenian side shared news about an attack by Azerbaijan’s combat drones on 
civilian settlements in the Berd village of the Tavush region (Kucera, July 14). 
The spokesperson of Armenian Ministry of Defense Shushan Stepanyan (2020) in 
her official Facebook page stated that the Armenian Minister of Defense, David Tonoyan, 
gave instructions to the military command: “in case of provocations of the enemy on the 
borders of the Republic of Armenia, react as necessary, up to the capture of new 
advantageous positions”. On July 14, the Armenian media spread the news that 
Azerbaijani military post on the Garagaya height was seized by Armenian forces 
(Nalbandyan & Bulghadaryan, July 14). The photos from this height have been shared in 
the Armenian media sources. Press secretary of Armenian Ministry of Defense, Artrun 
Hovhannisyan, replying to the questions about the Garagaya height stated that Armenia 
“has gained more favorable positions” and “let's wait for the official information” 
(Nalbandyan & Bulghadaryan, July 14). Actually, the local population of the Tovuz 
region also spread the news about an attempt to seize the military post in Garagaya. This 
is a very important strategic height. By capturing Garagaya height, Armenian would have 
control “over a strategically important highway, linking Azerbaijan’s second-largest city 
Ganja with neighboring Georgia” (Rzayev, 2020). However, the spokesman of 
Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense refuted these claims by stating that this is 
disinformation aimed at distracting public opinion (Azertac, July 13). Later, Armenian 
officials did not confirm the information about the seizure of the Garagaya post.  
The military officials of both countries continued reporting about the elimination 
of combat and intelligence drones of the opposite side, whereas the officials of the 
opposite side refuted those claims. Moreover, till the end of hostilities, both countries 
accused each other of not revealing the true number of casualties and lost military 
vehicles. The clashes ended on July 16, 2020. Azerbaijani side informed about the 12 
military casualties and one civilian casualty. Armenian side reported four military 
casualties. As a result of clashes, none of the parties gained or lost any piece of land. 
Despite this, both Azerbaijani and Armenian authorities claimed the victory to their 
respective domestic audiences. 
4.3. Azerbaijan’s perception of the skirmishes and the international reaction 
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During the clashes, Azerbaijani experts argued that one of the major motives to 
attack Azerbaijan along the international borders was the desire of Armenian authorities 
to involve the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in the conflict (Veliyev, 
2020). Indeed, shortly after confrontations started, the Armenian side urged the CSTO to 
get involved by referring to Article 4 which obliges all member states to protect Armenia 
in case of aggression against it (Jafarova, 2020). However, the CSTO did not react 
urgently to the hostilities along the border despite Armenia’s allegations that Azerbaijan 
attacks its territory. The CSTO simply issued a statement calling both countries to 
immediately stop hostilities.  Azerbaijani experts and authorities argued that if Azerbaijan 
wanted to conduct a military attack it would do so on the occupied territories of Nagorno-
Karabakh and adjacent districts because these areas are internationally recognized 
territories of Azerbaijan (Veliyev, 2020). Only aggression against the internationally 
recognized territories of Armenia fall under the jurisdiction of the CSTO. The mandate 
of the military alliance is not upheld during the hostilities along the line of contact in 
Nagorno Karabakh.  
The main feature of Tovuz clashes was the fact that it was outside the Nagorno-
Karabakh region. “That basically manifested that Armenia has broader ambitions. It was 
the indication that Armenia would continue its expansionist policy” (F. Shafiyev, 
personal communication, December 9, 2020). It is important to make a distinction 
between the international border between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the line of contact 
which separates two armies in the conflict zone. Baku has always aimed to evade 
confrontation along the international borders due to the fact that Azerbaijan does not have 
any claims in regards to the internationally recognized territories of Armenia (F. 
Mammadov, personal communication, December 9, 2020). Furthermore, Azerbaijan 
demilitarized northern parts of the border with Armenia by reassigning the protection of 
these territories from the national army to the State Border Service (Azertac, 2020). 
Demilitarization of this zone was a clear signal that Baku is unwilling to initiate hostilities 
along the state borders (T. Gafarli, personal communication, December 25, 2020). 
Tovuz was sensitive because it was close to major regional oil and gas projects 
that Azerbaijan developed for decades. The Tovuz confrontation was perceived by 
Azerbaijan as an attack on its energy infrastructure (Jafarova, 2020). Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan oil pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway are 
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critical infrastructures for Azerbaijan’s economy and pass through the Tovuz district. 
Military hostilities and insecurity in the Tovuz district directly affect the operability of 
major energy and transportation routes. It is a matter of national security for Baku to 
guarantee the physical security of these infrastructures (A. Valiyev, personal 
communication, December 8, 2020). “It is one of the last places Baku would want to see 
fighting because it lies directly on strategic transportation lines that are essential to 
Azerbaijan’s independence, economic vitality, and strategic significance” (Bryza, 2020). 
Any disruption or damage to these vital infrastructures would damage the whole economy 
of the country.  
The geostrategic importance of the Tovuz district dragged the attention of an 
international community to this fighting since the US, the EU, and Turkey’s interests are 
involved here. Energy infrastructure that connects the Caspian basin with the EU 
countries passes through the Tovuz district. The Southern Gas Corridor delivers 
Azerbaijani natural gas from Shah Deniz 2 fields to European markets transiting through 
the territory of Georgia and Turkey. The Southern Gas Corridor includes the Baku-
Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline, and the Trans-
Adriatic Pipeline. It is an alternative route for the energy security of the EU and Turkey. 
In the first half of 2020, Azerbaijan supplied 2.7 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas to 
Turkey through the Southern Gas Corridor and this comprised 23 percent of the Turkish 
energy market (Babayev, 2020). Actually, the corridor has a capacity to annually deliver 
6 bcm of gas to Turkey and 10 bcm to Europe. With the launch of the Trans-Adriatic 
pipeline which was expected to be in late 2020, Baku will start delivering gas to the EU 
countries. An attack on Tovuz is an attack on Azerbaijan’s entire energy infrastructure 
and regional projects (A. Valiyev, personal communication, December 8, 2020). 
Therefore, an increased threat to the security of this region required a very assertive 
reaction from the Azerbaijani side (F. Ismailzade, personal communication, December 
10, 2020). 
The reaction of the international community to the border clashes has been mostly 
neutral. The majority of the countries called the sides of the conflict to immediately end 
hostilities.  They asked Azerbaijan and Armenia to resolve the issue in a peaceful manner 
and avoid provoking each other. Iran and Georgia called parties to the conflict to stop 
hostilities and voiced their concerns regarding the aggravation of the situation in the 
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region. The EU, Russia, and the US asked both countries to stick to the peaceful resolution 
of the conflict (Jafarova, 2020). Although most countries stayed neutral, there have been 
some countries and organizations that chose sides by openly expressing their support to 
one of the sides. Turkey was one of the first countries that reacted to the hostilities by 
issuing statements on all levels of government. The President of Turkey, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, and other high-ranking government officials explicitly supported 
Azerbaijan and condemned the Armenian aggression. Pakistan was another country that 
openly expressed its support to Azerbaijan and criticized the attacks on the Tovuz district. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan issued a statement where it was emphasized 
that any solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be within the territorial 
integrity of Azerbaijan (Mansurov & Sheikh, 2020, p. 76). The Organization for 
Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM) supported Azerbaijan and expressed 
its condolences for soldiers who have been the victims of the aggression (Mansurov & 
Sheikh, 2020, p. 76). Ukraine expressed its support to Baku and emphasized the 
importance of resolving the conflict within the principles of territorial integrity. Moldova 
also issued a statement calling for a peaceful resolution of the conflict based on the 
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan (Mansurov & Sheikh, 2020, p. 76). Cyprus explicitly 
supported Yerevan and condemned Azerbaijan’s aggression (Mansurov & Sheikh, 2020, 
p. 76).   
4.4. Tovuz skirmishes in the context of the geopolitical competition between Russia 
and Turkey 
The aggravation of hostilities on the Azerbaijani-Armenian international borders 
carries the risks of developing into the new area of intensively rising geopolitical 
competition between Russia and Turkey. There is a clash of interests between Moscow 
and Ankara in the July skirmishes since they support the opposing parties to the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. The Tovuz incident conveys challenges to increasingly competitive 
relations between Ankara and Moscow, which are already engaged in proxy wars in Syria 
and Libya. Armenia is the closest Russian ally in the South Caucasus and both countries 
share the membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which guarantees 
the mechanism for collective defense in the event of a military attack against a member 
state. Turkey, on the other hand, plays a role of a security guarantor for Azerbaijan since 
two close neighbors have an Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support, 
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which establishes a commitment for both countries to defend each other in the case of 
external aggression. Consequently, the escalation of military actions along the 
international borders between Azerbaijan and Armenia might have enabled the activation 
of the collective defense mechanisms of both security pacts. 
Despite periodic coldness in Azerbaijani-Turkish relations like the one caused by 
the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement attempts in 2008, Ankara and Baku have always 
been supportive of each other and this mutual support was based on cultural links and 
shared geopolitical interests. The recent rise of Turkey as a regional power that can be 
competitive on a global level creates new opportunities for Baku to use in its foreign 
policy. Consequently, the growing assertiveness of Turkey creates a possibility for 
increased involvement of Ankara in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In 
order to consolidate its regional power status, Turkey is willing to play a more active role 
in the negotiation process that is currently mediated by the OSCE Minsk group. The 
energy cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey plays one of the major roles in 
Turkey’s growing support of Azerbaijan. The rising Turkish influence in the Caucasus 
challenges Russian dominance in the region. Russia perceives the South Caucasus as its 
own sphere of influence and it does not tolerate the intervention of other regional powers 
in its near neighborhood, especially NATO members. Moscow maintains its status as the 
major power in the South Caucasus and wields an extensive influence over Yerevan, and 
breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The influence over Baku and Tbilisi 
is still existent, but it substantially decreased for the last decade. With the diminishing 
role of the Western countries in the South Caucasus, Russia to some extent tolerates the 
increasing influence of Turkey, but within the red lines set by Moscow.  
Turkey has firmly reacted to Tovuz fighting by condemning Armenia’s aggression 
and publicly demonstrated its political and military support to Azerbaijan. The Turkish 
president said: "Turkey will never hesitate to stand against any attack on the rights and 
lands of Azerbaijan, with which it has deep-rooted friendly ties and brotherly relations'' 
(Bryza, 2020). Turkey’s Foreign and Defense Ministers also publicly supported Baku and 
demonstrated that if any external actor intervenes in the conflict, Turkey will not leave 
Azerbaijan alone and would take all necessary measures to ensure Azerbaijan’s security. 
The Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance Agreement signed by Azerbaijan and 
Turkey in 2010 provides the legal basis for Ankara’s interference in case of aggression 
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against Azerbaijan. President Erdogan specifically mentioned that attacking Azerbaijan 
and extending the conflict zone is a move that goes “beyond Armenia’s caliber” (Tol & 
Bechev, 2020). Some analysts interpreted Erdogan’s speech as referring to Moscow’s role 
in instigating Armenia to provoke hostilities (Jones, 2020).  
Pro-governmental media sources in Turkey started blaming Moscow for this 
aggression against Azerbaijan by referring to the rising confrontation between Turkey 
and Russia in the Middle East. Actually, the Tovuz skirmishes were interpreted as an 
indicator of an extension of a geopolitical competition area between Moscow and Ankara 
to the Caucasus. According to Avinoam Idan (2020), “the violence in the region of Tovuz 
is, it seems, in actuality reflects a clash between Russia and Turkey, wherein Russia used 
Armenia as leverage in its confrontation with Turkey”.  Ankara and Moscow have already 
confronted each other in Syria and Libya by supporting opposing sides in the civil wars. 
According to Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, Turkey perceives the Tovuz incident as a message 
from Moscow and recognizes that it is very dangerous to directly confront Russia in the 
South Caucasus (Yackley, 2020). 
As geopolitical competition between Russia and Turkey in the Middle East 
intensified, Turkey has been increasingly worried that its foreign policy interests might 
be undermined due to the traditional Russian mechanisms of influence. Moscow has long 
been using the disruption of energy supplies as a source of leverage in its foreign policy 
(Mammadov & Marshall, 2020). It used it against Georgia in the 2008 war, against 
Ukraine in 2014. Turkey has long been largely dependent on Russian gas to ensure its 
energy security. For the last three decades, Turkey has been striving to diversify its energy 
supplies by promoting the trilateral partnership with Azerbaijan and Georgia. Ankara has 
long been cooperating with Azerbaijan and Georgia on the construction of alternative 
energy routes from the Caspian basin to Turkey. The Southern Gas Corridor creates an 
opportunity to deliver energy resources of the Caspian Sea to the EU through the territory 
of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. This corridor bypasses Russia and thus is a rival 
project to the Russian-led South Stream project. The completion of the Southern Gas 
Corridor serves the strategic interests of Ankara since it would enable Turkey to develop 
its role as a crucial energy and transportation hub between Europe and Asia (Mammadov 
& Marshall, 2020). Moreover, this corridor diversifies energy supplies to Turkey. All the 
major energy infrastructure that connects Azerbaijan with Turkey passes through the 
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Tovuz region and any damage to the physical security of these infrastructures would 
considerably destabilize Turkey’s energy security and Azerbaijan’s economy 
(Mammadov & Marshall, 2020). 
The Moscow-Ankara competition established very good conditions for 
Azerbaijan to gain the status of Turkey’s primary gas supplier and thus achieve even more 
considerable support in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Avdaliani, 2020). Indeed, 
Azerbaijan played a crucial role in the implementation of Ankara’s diversification policy. 
The natural gas supplies from Russia to Turkey decreased by 62% from the first half of 
2019 to the same period of 2020 (Avdaliani, 2020).  Azerbaijan’s supplies of natural gas 
to Turkey considerably increased with the finalization of the TANAP project at the end 
of 2019. Azerbaijan’s share of Turkey’s energy market reached 23.4% in the first half of 
2020, whereas Russia’s share during the same period was only 18% (Avdaliani, 2020; 
Rzayeva, 2020). Thus, Azerbaijan became Turkey’s major gas supplier in May 2020 by 
surpassing Russia (Avdaliani, 2020). “Azerbaijani gas is thus set to play a central role in 
Turkey’s evolving approach toward Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” 
(Avdaliani, 2020). The growing role of Baku as a major supplier of gas to Turkey 
challenges the Russian dominant position in the energy market of Turkey. With the 
enhancing diversification of energy routes to Turkey, Russia begins to lose its dominance 
as a major supplier of gas which is an essential foreign policy tool in the Kremlin’s 
relations with Ankara (Guler, 2020). The loss of such an important source of leverage 
reduces Moscow’s chances to influence Ankara’s decisions in geopolitical competition 
in the Middle East. Consequently, the escalation of hostilities on the border could reflect 
the growing tension between Moscow and Ankara related to the gradual refusal of the 
Russian gas supplies. The ability of Moscow to impact the political decisions of its only 
ally in the South Caucasus provides Moscow with an additional source of leverage on 
Ankara (Idan, 2020). Therefore, Tovuz skirmishes were interpreted as a reflection of 
geopolitical competition between Moscow and Ankara. 
4.5. Conclusion 
Before the Tovuz skirmishes, there have been several events that underlined the 
growing tension between the sides of the conflict. Armenia’s new military doctrine, 
presidential and parliamentary elections in Karabakh, and Armenia’s plans to build a road 
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to Jabrayil city were provocatively perceived in Azerbaijan. Moreover, statements and 
new conditions set by Nikol Pashinyan reflected the rejection of the Madrid Principles by 
Armenia. In the immediate background to the clashes, the negotiation process reached a 
deadlock position. 
 One of the most important features of the July skirmishes was the fact that it 
happened outside the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Azerbaijan perceived the Tovuz 
skirmishes as an attack on its energy infrastructure since the vital energy projects pass 
through this region. Turkey openly expressed its support to Azerbaijan and condemned 
Armenia’s attacks. Most countries remained neutral and asked both sides of the conflict 
to stop hostilities. Although Russia remained neutral in its reaction to the skirmishes, it 
organized joint military drills with Armenia right after the end of the clashes. The Tovuz 
incident has been a shocking event for Azerbaijan and it certainly had consequences on 
Azerbaijan’s diplomacy towards external actors. The implications of the Tovuz clashes 
on Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia and Turkey, on the solution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, and on the overall security strategy of Azerbaijan will be discussed in 














5. Analysis of short-term consequences of the Tovuz clashes for Azerbaijan’s 
security policy 
This chapter will provide an analysis of implications of the Tovuz skirmishes for 
Azerbaijan’s security policy. The first section will examine short-term changes in 
diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation in the immediate 
aftermath of the Tovuz clashes. In the second section, changing patterns of bilateral 
relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey will be discussed. More specifically, the 
inclination of Azerbaijani authorities towards short-term realignment with Turkey will be 
analyzed in terms of deepened military cooperation, mutual political support, and 
cooperation in non-military spheres as well. The third section of this chapter will explore 
the implications of the July skirmishes on the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
The last section will analyze how the short-term changes in Azerbaijan’s diplomacy are 
reflected in its overall security strategy towards external powers.  
5.1. Azerbaijani-Russian relations after the Tovuz skirmishes 
The emergence of new challenges in relations between Baku and Moscow could 
be observed while the geopolitical environment and the balance of power in the region 
changes. Russia’s military support to Armenia in the midst of the aggravation of the 
situation on the border and subsequent Russian-Armenian joint military drills right after 
the end of the Tovuz clashes created very negative reactions among the Azerbaijani elites 
and society. Although there have been various challenges in Azerbaijani-Russian 
relations throughout recent history, Azerbaijan has long maintained a balanced approach 
in its relations with the regional powers. An external shocking event such as the increased 
threat to Azerbaijan’s national security might be the factor to persuade Azerbaijani 
authorities to make a drastic pivot in its foreign policy orientation by allying with Turkey 
to balance Russian influence in the South Caucasus. The rise of Turkey as a new regional 
power capable of challenging Russian dominance in the South Caucasus might encourage 
official Baku to reconsider its relations with Russia. 
Right after the Tovuz incident, Azerbaijani-Russian relations experienced 
increased tensions since Azerbaijani officials accused Russia of intentionally fueling the 
conflict by supplying Yerevan with military armaments. During and aftermath of the 
Tovuz clashes, there have been seven flights of military transportation planes from Russia 
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to Armenia. Since Georgia did not allow the use of its airspace, the military cargo planes 
have been intensively delivering weapons to Armenia using the airspace of Caspian 
countries: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran. One of the flights occurred during the 
fierce fighting in Tovuz, the rest of the flights happened immediately after the end of the 
incident on 18, 20, 27, 29 July, and 4,6 August (Azernews, August 31). The 
comprehensive military support to Armenia created discontent among the Azerbaijani 
society and elites. On August 12, President Aliyev discussed this issue with Vladimir 
Putin over the telephone conversation and expressed Baku’s position in respect to this 
problem. Azerbaijani president emphasized that the volume of military cargo delivered 
to Armenia during and aftermath of the border clashes exceeded 400 tons. He asked Putin 
for clarification of this issue since it raises "concern and serious questions among the 
Azerbaijani public" (President.az, August 13). Azerbaijani authorities did not reveal the 
details of Putin’s response to the expressed concern. The member of Azerbaijan’s 
Parliament, Rasim Musabayov, emphasized that the reaction from Baku indicated that 
Azerbaijan would make inferences from the recent events and would intensify its military 
cooperation with Ankara, while gradually reducing military purchases from Moscow 
(BBC, August 30). 
On August 25, the Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu arrived in Baku to 
participate in the opening ceremony of the Sea Cup. During the visit, the Russian minister 
commented on the growing concern of the Azerbaijani side. Even though Sergey Shoigu 
claimed that these flights were used with the purpose of delivering the construction 
materials for the Russian military base in Gyumri, this response did not convince 
Azerbaijani society and specifically the Azerbaijani president’s foreign policy advisor, 
Hikmat Hajiyev. He said: “military cargoes are delivered from Russia to Armenia, and 
this seriously worries the Azerbaijani state and the public. We are not satisfied with the 
explanations of the Russian side" (Azernews, August 31). Mr. Hajiyev emphasized that 
the Azerbaijani society is waiting for the sincere and open response from the Russian side 
on these questions: “On what basis and with what purpose Moscow continues to 
intensively supply Yerevan in the background of Armenia’s aggression in Tovuz” 
(Azernews, August 31). Hikmat Hajiyev’s response demonstrates that the Azerbaijani 
relevant structures have very accurate and trustworthy information on the composition of 
these supplies. The essence of Hikmat Hajiyev’s statement consists in the fact he publicly 
73 
 
refuted Shoygu’s response and revealed the assertive stance of Azerbaijan on this matter. 
Besides, it is obvious that Ilham Aliyev and Vladimir Putin discussed these issues in 
private conversation and the Azerbaijani president has already received an answer to his 
question. Russian Minister of Defense tried to ease the situation during the visit to the 
Azerbaijani capital, however, the Azerbaijani authorities remained principled in this 
sensitive matter. By aggravating this issue through the media and statements by the 
officials, Baku puts pressure on and sends a message to Moscow about its discontent.  
Even though Baku occasionally expressed its concern to Moscow for its 
continuous military support for Yerevan, it has typically done so through the media. After 
the Tovuz incident, Azerbaijan’s high-level officials expressed their complaints to 
Russian counterparts regarding the Russian military provision to Yerevan in the middle 
of the conflict. There has been a considerable change of rhetoric as president Aliyev 
openly informed Vladimir Putin about his and Azerbaijani society’s concerns about the 
growing Russian support of Armenia. “It is not a coincidence that after the Tovuz clashes 
Azerbaijani government started to be louder about the military supplies from Russia to 
Armenia. President Aliyev himself talked about it in international media,” said Vasif 
Huseynov, a senior research fellow at the Center of Analysis of International Relations 
(AIR Center) in Baku. It was something unusual happening in Azerbaijan’s relations with 
Russia because Azerbaijani authorities were very careful with statements regarding 
Russia, but After the Tovuz clashes, they openly started criticizing Russia’s military 
supplies to Armenia (V. Huseynov, personal communication, December 24, 2020). “That 
was the major change that happened in Azerbaijan’s diplomacy. The government started 
to be more loudly in its criticism of Russia’s military commitment to Armenia, its support, 
and military supplies” (V. Huseynov, personal communication, December 24, 2020). 
Consequently, after the July skirmishes, Azerbaijani high-ranking officials started 
publicly questioning Russian military support to Armenia. The fact that this changed 
rhetoric happened during the unprecedented military rapprochement between Ankara and 
Baku created questions concerning the foreign policy orientation of Azerbaijan. 
There were also other events that signaled the tensions in relations between 
Moscow and Baku. Azerbaijan decided not to participate in the "Caucasus-2020” military 
training organized by Moscow. Azerbaijani authorities decided to send two observers and 
did not provide any details regarding the explanation of this choice. During these events, 
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there were some speculations in Azerbaijan’s society that the decision was made due to 
coldness in relations with Moscow, but it could be also because of the unwillingness of 
Azerbaijani forces to participate in military drills together with the Armenian military 
especially taking into account the recent aggravation of the situation on the border of two 
states (Avdaliani, 2020). 
Although Baku changed its rhetoric towards Russia and there have been some 
tensions between the two states, their relations did not completely deteriorate. Baku and 
Moscow continue to remain important strategic partners that have mutual interests in 
various spheres of cooperation. On August 26, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Azerbaijan, Jeyhun Bayramov, made an official visit to Moscow where he met with the 
Russian counterpart.  Changing rhetoric of Azerbaijani authorities towards Russia could 
be just a short-term tactical maneuver (Avdaliani, 2020). The changing rhetoric also 
reflects Baku’s intention to more actively engage Turkey in the region and expectations 
for a bigger role of Ankara in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Avdaliani, 
2020). 
5.2. Azerbaijani-Turkish relations after the Tovuz clashes  
The aggression against Tovuz represented an enormous threat to Azerbaijan’s 
security from two perspectives. First of all, under the background of Yerevan’s increased 
militaristic and offensive stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Moscow’s 
military support to Armenia in the middle of skirmishes, Baku has perceived the 
possibility of further aggression and the loss of new territories. Secondly, the instability 
in the Tovuz corridor, which represents crucial strategic importance for Azerbaijan’s 
energy and transportation strategy with Georgia, Turkey, and the EU, would disrupt the 
operability of the energy pipelines and hurt Azerbaijan’s economy. The increased threat 
to Azerbaijan’s national security and crucial economic infrastructure during the Tovuz 
skirmishes and Russian military supplies to Armenia pushed Azerbaijan further towards 
the consolidation of the Ankara-Baku military-political partnership (V. Huseynov, 
personal communication, December 24, 2020). Ankara’s absolute support to Baku during 
the Tovuz skirmishes has facilitated the deepening of the Azerbaijani-Turkish relations 
and encouraged the two countries to diversify bilateral relations in various areas. First of 
all, the military cooperation between the parties substantially increased right after the July 
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events. The deepening of military relations between Baku and Ankara can be evidenced 
by the drastic increase in Turkish military supplies to Azerbaijan, by the frequent and 
mutual visits of the high-ranking military officials, and by the most comprehensive joint 
military exercises in the recent history of bilateral military cooperation. Bilateral relations 
between Baku and Ankara deepened also outside the military sphere. Azerbaijan and 
Turkey announced the establishment of a common media and communication platform to 
jointly fight against the dissemination of false news targeting both countries in the 
international media. Moreover, Turkey’s Minister of Trade announced the plans to 
deepen economic relations by signing the free trade deal with Azerbaijan. Consequently, 
the deepening of Ankara-Baku relations was one of the major changes in Azerbaijan’s 
diplomacy right after the Tovuz events (V. Huseynov, personal communication, 
December 24, 2020).  Ankara-Baku relations have been evolving for three decades and 
nowadays, we can observe the highest point in the cooperation between two countries 
since the proclamation of Azerbaijan’s independence in 1991.  
Despite certain ups and downs in bilateral relations, Turkey has always been fairly 
consistent in its approach to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by supporting Azerbaijan and 
demanding Armenia to act in accordance with international law and four resolutions of 
the UN Security Council. Turkey has always been determined to advocate Azerbaijan’s 
interests in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict but in a more balanced way. We can observe 
a significant change in Ankara’s reaction to the conflict during the Tovuz skirmishes. 
“This time, Turkey has been instrumental, very active, and assertive” (F. Ismailzade, 
personal communication, December 10, 2020). Turkey’s high-ranking officials including 
president Erdogan demonstrated a very robust position in the border skirmishes between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia. It was unusual for Ankara to express such strong rhetoric in the 
South Caucasus. Many experts related Ankara’s firm rhetoric and proactive position in 
the conflict to Erdogan’s highly assertive foreign policy and intention to assert Turkey as 
a rising geopolitical force in the South Caucasus.  
 During the July events, Turkey more proactively engaged in the conflict and has 
taken a much more assertive stance compared to its reactions in previous years. “We 
engaged Turkey into South Caucasus this time. Unlike in 2016, in 2020 we observed a 
very active involvement of Turkey and other players such as Pakistan, and Israel in a form 
of military supply and political support” (F. Ismailzade, personal communication, 
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December 10, 2020). Right after the beginning of the hostilities, Turkey’s high-ranking 
governmental and military officials expressed their support to Azerbaijan by making very 
robust statements demanding Armenia to stop hostilities. “Turkey stood next to 
Azerbaijan. That was an important message to the world and to Russia that Turkey will 
not leave Azerbaijan alone” (F. Ismailzade, personal communication, December 10, 
2020). 
5.2.1. Increased military cooperation with Turkey 
A day after the end of the Tovuz incident, on the 17th of July Russia launched 
joint military drills in Armenia. Against the backdrop of growing tensions in the South 
Caucasus, Azerbaijan and Turkey announced joint military exercises, which were 
scheduled from July 29 to August 10.  These military exercises have been the most 
comprehensive and the largest in the contemporary history of military collaboration 
between Ankara and Baku (V. Huseynov, personal communication, December 24, 2020). 
On July 31, F-16 jets of Turkish Air Forces arrived in Baku in order to participate in the 
TurAz Eagle 2020 joint aviation exercises (Mod.gov.az, July 31). These military 
exercises were broadly perceived by experts as a response to the Tovuz skirmishes and 
Russo-Armenian joint military drills (A. Valiyev, personal communication, December 8, 
2020). According to Elkhan Shahinoglu, the director of Atlas Research Center, the joint 
military exercises were an important message to Yerevan and the external forces that were 
behind it (Mehdiyev, 2020). The importance of this message is that it clearly reflected 
Azerbaijan’s perspective and reaction to the Tovuz skirmishes. Furthermore, Elkhan 
Shahinoglu emphasizes that amid the recent military supplies to Armenia and joint 
military drills of Russian and Armenian forces, it is necessary for Baku to intensify 
military cooperation with Ankara (Mehdiyev, 2020). 
In the midst of the aggravation of fighting on the border, high-ranking Azerbaijani 
military officials went to Turkey to discuss the situation in the region and the development 
of military collaboration. After the meeting with the Azerbaijani Deputy Defense 
Minister, the head of the Turkish Defense Industry, Ismail Demir, stated: “Our defense 
industry is always at the disposal of Azerbaijan with all its experience, technology, and 
capabilities” (Ergocun, 2020). On August 13, a Turkish delegation led by Defense 
Minister, Hulusi Akar, arrived in Baku. During the meeting with Hulusi Akar, President 
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Aliyev emphasized the significance of expanding military cooperation with Ankara and 
underlined that in the near future Turkey will become the major arms supplier to 
Azerbaijan (Daily Sabah, 2020). 
Azerbaijan’s growing military cooperation with Turkey can also be reflected in 
the drastic increase of arms supplies to Baku after the Tovuz clashes. “Sales jumped from 
$278,880 in the month of July to $36 million in the month of August, and $77.1 million 
in just September” (Toksabay, 2020). Overall, during the period of January-September of 
2020, Azerbaijan has purchased various kinds of military equipment worth $123 million 
(Toksabay, 2020). A substantial part (92 %) of the purchases accounts for the period after 
the July skirmishes. If we compare this data to the arms purchases from Turkey in the 
first nine months of 2019, we would observe a six-fold increase in the same period of 
2020. Thus, Turkey’s role as an arms exporter to Azerbaijan substantially increased in 
the aftermath of the Tovuz fighting. The military drills right after the July incident, the 
enhanced military cooperation with Baku reflect the increased proximity between Ankara 
and Baku and can serve as evidence of Turkey’s willingness to engage more actively in 
the region. 
Right after the start of joint military exercises of Azerbaijani and Turkish forces, 
there have been speculations in Azerbaijani and Turkish media that high-ranking military 
officials from two countries discuss the possibility of the formation of Turkish military 
bases in Azerbaijan as a counterbalance to the Russian base in Armenia (Jasem, 2020). 
These speculations also disseminated in the news media of some post-Soviet countries 
including Russia. In the article published by Russian Nezavisimaya Gazeta, it is argued 
that the Turkish army is still in Baku and the high-ranking military officials discuss the 
question of establishing an official military base in Azerbaijan (Muhin, 2020). Despite 
growing speculations, the establishment of the Turkish military base in Azerbaijan is not 
real taking into account Azerbaijan’s major foreign policy principles and the geopolitical 
context. Azerbaijan strives to pursue an independent multilateral foreign policy based on 
national interests. The establishment of foreign military base will considerably restrict the 
autonomy and freedom of Azerbaijani authorities in making foreign policy decisions and 
pursuit of national interests.   
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There are permanent military exercises between Azerbaijan and Turkey. 
According to military agreements between parties, throughout the year Azerbaijani 
military forces can be in Turkey and the Turkish military can be in Azerbaijan. Thus, it 
means that from a formal point of view, the Turkish military forces and equipment can 
be present in Azerbaijan since they have the right to conduct joint military exercises 
throughout the year (F. Mammadov, personal communication, December 9, 2020). 
“Therefore, I do not think there is a need to create an infrastructure for a military base. 
There is already an arranged infrastructure for deploying Turkish troops to Azerbaijan, if 
necessary, and vice versa” (F. Mammadov, personal communication, December 9, 2020). 
“There are already Turkish air forces located in Azerbaijan. The de-facto Turkish army 
has been in Baku since August, but officially building a Turkish military base is not real, 
especially in the short term. Maybe in the long term, something could change” (T. Gafarli, 
personal communication, December 25, 2020). Dr. Farid Shafiyev also does not exclude 
the possibility of a Turkish military base in the future. “Establishment of the military base 
might happen in the future depending on the overall security situation in the region. If a 
more military threat arises against Azerbaijan” (F. Shafiyev, personal communication, 
December 9, 2020).  
5.2.2. Intensification of Azerbaijan’s partnership with Turkey in other spheres 
Azerbaijan’s military cooperation with Turkey expanded substantially after the 
Tovuz incident which was evidenced by the increased purchases of military equipment 
from Turkey, by the extended presence of the Turkish F-16s and other military staff in 
Azerbaijan, and by the considerably increased visits of Turkish military officials to 
Azerbaijan and vice versa. However, enhanced cooperation between Ankara and Baku 
was not limited only to the military sphere, the deepening of bilateral relations can be 
observed in other domains as well. One of the major domains of interest was the 
establishment of the joint media and communication platform with the primary purpose 
of incorporating the media sources of Azerbaijan and Turkey in the joint struggle against 
false news and black propaganda (Hurriyet Daily News, 2020). “It is not a coincidence 
that Azerbaijani officials including foreign policy advisors made visits to Turkey and they 
sought to develop relations with Turkey in other spheres” (V. Huseynov, personal 
communication, December 24, 2020). The news about the establishment of the common 
media platform was confirmed during the official visit of the assistant to the President of 
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Azerbaijan, Hikmat Hajiyev, to Ankara on September 7, 2020 (Hurriyet Daily News, 
2020). The formation of such a platform is understandable in the face of an increased 
spread of fabricated news in the international media sources and social media during the 
Tovuz skirmishes. Thus, this media platform is essential for Azerbaijan’s public 
diplomacy. It provides an opportunity to work with the Turkish media representatives in 
order to swiftly disseminate true and accurate information to the international audience 
and tackle the spread of disinformation and fake news targeting Turkey and Azerbaijan 
in international and social media. 
During and after the Tovuz incident, we can observe the substantial increase of 
mutual visits between officials at all governmental levels of the two countries. On August 
11, Azerbaijan’s newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jeyhun Bayramov, made 
his first foreign visit to Ankara. During the meeting with his Turkish counterpart, 
Bayramov emphasized that one of the crucial foreign policy priorities of Azerbaijan is to 
deepen and intensify its cooperation with Ankara (Mammadov, 2020). Turkish Foreign 
Minister, Mevlut Cavushoghlu, underlined the growing role of Baku in the Turkish 
energy market and revealed the plans to increase the supplies of natural gas from 
Azerbaijan (Mammadov, 2020). On September 2, President Aliyev supported Turkey 
over the maritime dispute between Ankara and Athens in the Eastern Mediterranean 
region. During the meeting with the Greek ambassador to Azerbaijan, President Aliyev 
stated: “Without any hesitation whatsoever, we support Turkey and will support it in any 
circumstances. We see the same support from our Turkish brothers. They support 
Azerbaijan on all issues, and we support them on all issues, including the issue of 
intelligence in the Eastern Mediterranean” (Azertac, 2020).  
On September 11, the Azerbaijani delegation led by Sahiba Gafarova, the speaker 
of Azerbaijan’s Parliament, visited Ankara and met with Turkey’s Minister of Trade 
Ruhsar Pekcan (Bicer, 2020). After the meeting, the parties announced that the current 
trade turnover between Baku and Ankara does not reveal the real potential and there are 
plans to substantially expand trade volume by achieving a free trade deal (Bicer, 2020).  
The drastic increase in military supplies, explicit political support to Azerbaijan 
in the middle of the aggravation of the situation in the border, the most comprehensive 
joint military drills, numerous mutual visits of Turkish and Azerbaijani political and 
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military officials during and aftermath of the conflict, intensified cooperation in other 
spheres reflect the major changes that happened in the bilateral relations of Ankara and 
Baku right after the Tovuz skirmishes. 
5.3. Implications on the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
The July border skirmishes between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the subsequent 
enhanced military cooperation between Ankara and Baku had certain implications on the 
balance of power in the South Caucasus and on the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. The unconditional and explicit support of Ankara has obviously encouraged 
Azerbaijan to confront Yerevan and its external supporters in a more assertive way 
(Huseynov, 2020). The growing threat to Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and the demand 
of the domestic audience to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict aftermath of the July 
skirmishes along with the rise of Turkey as a regional power and its support to Azerbaijan 
compelled Baku to consider the military solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.   
One of the most essential impacts of the Tovuz skirmishes was to make Baku 
reconsider its approach to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Baku has 
always threatened Yerevan that it would not hesitate to reconsider its policy and move 
towards the military solution if diplomatic attempts would not generate any outcomes. Of 
course, the regional context and the deadlock of the negotiation process also contributed 
to the reevaluation of Baku’s policy tools towards the resolution of the conflict. 
Armenia’s Prime Minister’s provocative for Azerbaijan actions and statements 
concerning Nagorno-Karabakh led to the complete stalemate in the negotiation process. 
Rejection of the Madrid Principles to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by 
the new Armenian government and David Tonoyan’s new security approach were the 
initial factors that could influence Baku’s reconsideration of its attitude towards the 
diplomatic resolution of the conflict. Furthermore, Turkey’s appearance as a rising 
regional power and its active support to Azerbaijan right after the July events were also 
additional factors that prompted and emboldened Baku to consider the use of military 
force. 
 In the background of the changing geopolitical situation in the Caucasus and the 
complete deadlock of the negotiation efforts, the July aggression against the crucial 
geostrategic district of Azerbaijan was a shocking external event that triggered the 
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determination among the local population and political elites of Azerbaijan to seriously 
consider the military solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and start the preparation 
for the war. “Tovuz event was a trigger for the next war. It demonstrated that Azerbaijan’s 
national security is undermined and threatened. That’s why it forced Baku to think of a 
military solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” (A. Valiyev, personal 
communication, December 8, 2020). “Armenia regretted that it attacked Tovuz because 
Azerbaijan has received a very good opportunity to liberate the occupied territories. So, 
aggression against Tovuz was responded in a very assertive way in Karabakh” (F. 
Ismailzade, personal communication, December 10, 2020). Consequently, the Tovuz 
skirmishes resulting in the increased threats to Azerbaijan’s security in a sense of 
possibility of the new aggression and the loss of new territories forced Azerbaijan to 
switch to drastic measures and consider the use of military tools rather than relying solely 
on diplomatic tools in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
On July 14, thousands of Azerbaijanis took to the streets to show their support to 
the military. Due to the news of the death of the very famous Major General, Polad 
Hashimov, the angered audience demanded the state mobilization and the beginning of 
the military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh (BBC, July 15). The domestic sentiment 
could be an additional factor that prompted Azerbaijani authorities to consider the tough 
stance of the use of military force instead of a continuation of the deadlocked negotiations. 
However, it should also be mentioned that this was not the first time when the domestic 
audience made it clear to the authorities that they are not happy with the ineffectual peace 
negotiations longing for three decades. Interviewed experts also did not mention the 
domestic factor as the one that prompted Azerbaijan to reconsider its stance on the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  
The military drills right after the July incident, the enhanced military cooperation 
with Baku reflect the increased proximity between Ankara and Baku and can serve as 
evidence of Turkey’s willingness to engage more actively in the region. Ankara took an 
assertive position in the conflict and established itself as an important security actor in 
the region whose interests should be taken into consideration. “And this in many ways 
has determined the fate of Tovuz clashes and the second Karabakh conflict. It deterred 
Russia from an open interference in the conflict, it deterred Russia from sending troops 
to support Armenia” (F. Ismailzade, personal communication, December 10, 2020) Even 
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though officially military exercises were supposed to finish on August 10, Turkish F-16 
jets remained in Azerbaijan even after the end of exercises. In his appeal to the domestic 
audience, President Aliyev emphasized that Turkish F-16s and the explicit support of 
Turkey were addressed towards external actors as a measure of deterrence. Ankara’s 
actions deterred Armenia’s allies from involvement in the conflict and this played a 
crucial role in Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh war. Turkey played the role 
of a counterbalancing force in Baku’s efforts to return the occupied territories (T. Gafarli, 
personal communication, December 25, 2020).  
Turkey’s unconditional and clear support to Azerbaijan from military and 
governmental leaders was an act of deterrence strategy in order to prevent external powers 
from involvement in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. “We also see that it 
opened a new opportunity for Turkey to be more actively involved in the South Caucasus 
strategically. Turkey will be a more active player in the South Caucasus and Russia will 
have to deal with it and accept this new reality. In a way, we see the South Caucasus as a 
region that is divided between two regional powers: Russia and Turkey. We see less and 
less the presence of Western powers in this region” (F. Ismailzade, personal 
communication, December 10, 2020). Ankara’s further commitment to Azerbaijan during 
the Second Karabakh War has considerably enhanced its image and status as a reliable 
ally and regional power that has a substantial weight in regional matters.  Before the 
conflicts, Turkey has been involved in the South Caucasus mainly in terms of the trilateral 
format in energy and transportation projects with Georgia and Azerbaijan. The failure of 
the OSCE Minsk Group to resolve the conflict in 26 years generated a power vacuum and 
rising regional powers such as Turkey gained an opportunity to fill this power vacuum 
and become a significant player in the negotiation process of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. Ankara has begun more proactively engaging in the South Caucasus and 
enhanced its stance as a significant security actor in the region. 
5.4. Implication of changes on Azerbaijan’s security strategy 
The previous sections discussed the changes in Azerbaijan’s relations with Turkey 
and Russian Federation right after the July clashes on the Azerbaijani-Armenian border. 
This section discusses the implications of these changes on Azerbaijan’s security strategy. 
Despite the considerable enhancement of Azerbaijani-Turkish military cooperation and 
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the growing tensions between Baku and Moscow, the interviewed experts asserted that 
Azerbaijan’s diplomacy in respect to the external actors did not fundamentally change. 
“Many people claim that Azerbaijan made a drastic choice in favor of Azerbaijani-
Turkish relations at the cost of Azerbaijani-Russian relations. But there is no evidence to 
support this claim” (V. Huseynov, personal communication, December 24, 2020). 
Azerbaijan has always been supportive of multi-vector foreign policy and has always 
maintained a balanced approach between different external powers. “If Azerbaijan makes 
reckless foreign policy choices and endangers geopolitical balance in the region, it might 
cause serious troubles for Azerbaijan” (V. Huseynov, personal communication, 
December 24, 2020). “Azerbaijan has a very consistent foreign policy based on certain 
principles” (F. Mammadov, personal communication, December 9, 2020). The 
fundamental principles of Azerbaijan’s diplomacy have been the restoration of 
Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, independent foreign policy in the international arena, 
and pursuit of national interests. Azerbaijani authorities make foreign policy decisions 
based on these core principles. “After the Tovuz events, Azerbaijan intensified relations 
with Turkey. But obviously didn’t break up with Russia or the US. Azerbaijan’s foreign 
policy was getting ready for something bigger. They successfully kept the balance 
between Russia and Turkey” (T. Gafarli, personal communication, December 25, 2020). 
Azerbaijan successfully maintained the balance between major regional actors by not 
breaking relations with Moscow after the Tovuz skirmishes. Despite the changing 
rhetoric, Azerbaijan continued its strategic partnership with Russia. The multilateral 
diplomacy based on partnership with multiple actors and retaining good relations with 
Moscow allowed Azerbaijan to use military force in Nagorno-Karabakh without directly 
challenging the northern neighbor. 
Azerbaijan continues pursuing the strategic hedging strategy in its relations with 
regional powers. It is possible to track several elements of this strategy in the analysis of 
changes in Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia and Turkey. Growing military cooperation 
between Ankara and Baku increased Turkish military supplies, and the joint military 
exercises reflect the indirect balancing strategy in Azerbaijan’s hedging policy. Baku did 
not explicitly and fundamentally challenge Russian dominance. The measures employed 
by Azerbaijani elites reflect their discontent with Russia’s military supplies to Armenia 
right in the middle of the conflict. Baku reacted to the Russian actions during the July 
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hostilities by facilitating military cooperation with Ankara. “Azerbaijan always knew that 
Russia is very close with Armenia and provides massive military supplies. However, the 
military delivery during the Tovuz clashes and in the immediate aftermath was the factor 
which compelled Azerbaijan to seek more robust military cooperation with Turkey” (F. 
Shafiyev, personal communication, December 9, 2020).  
Even though this could seem like a profound transformation of the security 
strategy, the author would interpret it as a careful tactical maneuver employed by 
Azerbaijani authorities on the basis of the core principles of their foreign policy. This 
kind of tactical maneuver has always been employed in Baku’s relations with external 
powers. There have been very similar tensions in relations with Russia in 1997 during the 
presidency of Heydar Aliyev. After the Russian authorities granted Armenia weapons 
worth a billion dollars, Baku has engaged with NATO in terms of the possibility of 
increased military cooperation. There have even been speculations concerning the 
potential membership in NATO and the creation of a military base in Baku. Thus, the 
changes in Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia and Turkey might be just a short-term 
tactical maneuver analogous to the one that happened in 1997. 
Baku’s efforts to impact Moscow’s policies through the direct communication 
channels and media reflect the binding engagement element of Azerbaijan’s hedging 
strategy. Azerbaijan’s increased engagement with Turkey in various areas of bilateral 
relations, the mutual political support of two countries, and the choice of a military 
solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict reflect the dominance denial element of 
Azerbaijan’s hedging policy. Russia has always sought to attain geopolitical benefits by 
exploiting the conflicts in the surrounding areas and often provoking them. The Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict has been an important foreign policy tool for Moscow to retain both 
Azerbaijan and Armenia under its influence. Despite the role of mediator in the conflict, 
Russia has been providing both sides of the conflict with military supplies. The resolution 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not in the interests of Moscow, especially by military 
means. Thus, Azerbaijan’s decision to use military force to ultimately resolve the conflict 
to some extent challenged Russian interests. At the same time, it should be mentioned 
that Azerbaijan has formed an important principle for a small state: the ability to say no 
to great powers if their plans and actions conflict with Azerbaijan's national interests in 
the South Caucasus (F. Mammadov, personal communication, December 9, 2020).  
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“Azerbaijan cannot compete with large forces at the global level, but in this area of 
geography we are not only able to compete with them, but we are implementing our 
initiatives. If their policies are in conflict with ours, we can say no” (F. Mammadov, 
personal communication, December 9, 2020). Thus, Azerbaijani elites strive to conduct 
autonomous foreign policy in accordance with the national interests even if it collides 
with the interests of global and regional powers. There are numerous examples in the 
recent history of Azerbaijan when elites chose to pursue their own agenda at the detriment 
of the interests of global and regional powers. Azerbaijan stood contrary to Russian 
interests by shutting down Gabala Radar Station in 2012 (F. Mammadov, personal 
communication, December 9, 2020). Azerbaijani authorities demonstrated an assertive 
position during the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation attempts in 2008 since it collided 
with Azerbaijan’s interests. 
Azerbaijan continues its cooperation with Russia which can be evidenced by the 
official visit of Azerbaijan’s new foreign policy minister to Russia where he discussed 
bilateral relations in various areas.  Both countries continue their strategic partnership. 
“In fact, Russia has played a more neutral and more constructive role this year in 
comparison with last years. Russia understands that Azerbaijan is an important partner 
for Russia, an important regional partner. We have common interests in the Caspian Sea, 
common interest in the war against terrorism” (F. Ismailzade, personal communication, 
December 10, 2020). “There is no threat to Russia on the territory of Azerbaijan. We are 
predictable for Russia. We value each other as a strategic partner and we will cooperate 
on an equal basis” (F. Mammadov, personal communication, December 9, 2020). 
“Immediately after the end of the war, President Aliyev appreciated Russian support 
towards the establishment of the ceasefire” (V. Huseynov, personal communication, 
December 24, 2020). It is a matter of geopolitical necessity for Azerbaijan to maintain a 
balanced policy especially after the Second Karabakh war (V. Huseynov, personal 
communication, December 24, 2020). 
Thus, the fundamental principles of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy did not change 
and there was not a drastic pivot of security strategy towards the explicit balancing against 
the source of threat. Azerbaijan continues its balanced approach in its relations with 
external powers by cooperating with them and refraining from the open confrontation. 
The intensification of military cooperation with Ankara reflects the discontent expressed 
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towards Moscow for the military support to Armenia during the Tovuz clashes. The 
changing patterns of relations with Ankara and Moscow reflect a short-term tactical 
maneuver that also enabled Azerbaijan to consider the use of military force in the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijani authorities make independent foreign policy 
decisions based on national interests even if it collides with the interests of the great 
powers. Azerbaijan always leaves room for compromise and negotiations, but when the 
issue touches the cores of its foreign policy, then Baku takes a principled position like it 





















The objective of the study was to examine the behavior of a small state and the 
security policy employed during the imminent military threat to its security. A single case 
study was used as a research strategy. The author used the case of Azerbaijan after the 
Tovuz skirmishes for the purposes of this study. The study examined shifts in 
Azerbaijan’s security strategy as a result of perceived threats from the Tovuz clashes. The 
thesis sought to identify whether there has been a fundamental change in Azerbaijan’s 
relations with regional powers and the overall implications of the Tovuz skirmishes on 
Azerbaijan’s foreign policy decisions. The theoretical framework provided grounds 
through which the author examined the behavior and security policies employed by a 
small state during the times of imminent threat perception to its security. The concept of 
a small state and the strategies employed to cope with their threats were used as a 
conceptual basis of this thesis. Neorealist perspective on the determination of the security 
policy choice was employed in the thesis as a theoretical framework.  
The shifts in Azerbaijan’s security policy were examined through analysis of 
qualitative interviews with political experts that are close to Azerbaijan’s foreign policy 
elites or work in think tanks. Furthermore, the author collected and analyzed the data from 
various primary and secondary sources. News disseminated via Azerbaijan’s media, 
bilateral agreements of Azerbaijan with external powers, official statistical data, and the 
speeches of high-ranking officials delivered during and after the clashes have been 
thoroughly examined. Besides, numerous academic articles have been analyzed to 
examine Azerbaijan’s security strategy before the clashes.  
During the period of early independence, Azerbaijan’s security strategy drastically 
transformed several times because of frequent change of leaders. The first president of 
Azerbaijan, Ayaz Mutallibov, pursued a bandwagoning strategy by aligning with Russian 
Federation. He expected that pro-Russian foreign policy would ensure Azerbaijan’s 
territorial integrity by gaining Russian support in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
However, Mutallibov did not take into consideration the domestic unwillingness to 
participate in Russian-led integration projects. Therefore, the bandwagoning strategy 
proved to be inefficient in those circumstances. The second president of Azerbaijan, 
Abulfaz Elchibey, followed a balancing strategy against the source of threat. He wrongly 
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assessed the geopolitical realities of that time and assumed that a pro-Turkish and pro-
Western stance would help him to pursue independent foreign policy without making any 
concessions to Russia. The balancing strategy failed due to the incorrect calculation of 
the geopolitical realities of the region.  
After coming to power in October 1993, Heydar Aliyev learned the lessons from 
his predecessor’s mistakes and refrained from pursuing a clear pro- or anti-Russian 
approach. He accurately evaluated geopolitical context, domestic circumstances, and 
chose the strategy that would allow Azerbaijan to maintain autonomy in the foreign and 
domestic policies while not directly confronting the Russian Federation. Being the 
president of a small with rich natural resources and favorable geostrategic position, 
Heydar Aliyev pursued a hedging strategy in Azerbaijan’s relations with regional powers. 
The fundamental principles of Baku’s security strategy were the restoration of territorial 
integrity by resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the pursuit of an active and 
autonomous foreign policy based on Azerbaijan’s national interests. Realizing the 
constraints and challenges imposed on Azerbaijan due to its geostrategic position, Heydar 
Aliyev also recognized and exploited the opportunities given to Azerbaijan due to its 
geography. The abundance of natural resources and favorable geostrategic position 
allowed Azerbaijan to pursue an efficient hedging strategy by engaging with Russia and 
simultaneously continuing an autonomous foreign policy based on national interests. 
Azerbaijan established close partnerships in economic, energy, political, and social 
spheres with other regional actors such as the US, the EU, and Turkey.   
Ilham Aliyev maintained a hedging strategy in relations with regional powers. 
Azerbaijan implemented huge energy and transportations projects in a trilateral format of 
Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey. Despite being detrimental to Russian interests, Azerbaijan 
managed to finalize Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars, 
TANAP, TAP projects and enhance its partnership with Turkey and Western countries. 
As a result of these projects, Azerbaijan enhanced its international standing and political 
autonomy in foreign relations. Military cooperation with Tukey has been intensified 
during the presidency of Ilham Aliyev. Simultaneously, a strategic partnership with 
Russia was also maintained.  
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The Tovuz incident created an imminent threat to Azerbaijan’s security. Armed 
forces of Azerbaijan and Armenia confronted on the border of two states. Azerbaijan 
perceived these clashes as an attack on the crucial geostrategic corridor through which all 
the energy and transportation projects pass. The intensification of the Russian military 
provision to Armenia in the midst and aftermath of the clashes and Russian-Armenian 
joint military drills created an additional threat perception in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani 
authorities very negatively reacted to the Russian actions by publicly expressing their 
discontent regarding the provision of military supplies to Armenia. Azerbaijan 
demonstrated its principled stance on this sensitive issue by aggravating it through public 
statements of the president and his foreign policy advisor and through the media. Thus, 
there was a change in Azerbaijan’s rhetoric towards Russia after the Tovuz incident. 
Although this created tensions in Baku-Moscow relations, the two countries proceeded 
with their strategic partnership in various spheres. It should also be mentioned that on the 
official level, Russia remained neutral in its reaction to the conflict and did not choose 
any sides.  
The perception of an imminent threat as a result of the clashes and tensions with 
Moscow prompted Baku to further consolidate its military, political, and economic 
partnership with Ankara. Turkey’s unconditional support to Azerbaijan during the clashes 
has intensified and deepened the cooperation between the two countries. The 
intensification of military cooperation can be evidenced by the drastic rise of Turkish 
arms supplies to Azerbaijan, the largest joint military drills in the recent history of two 
countries, and regular mutual visits of high-level military officials. Ankara-Baku 
cooperation similarly consolidated in other spheres as well, which can be reflected in the 
formation of common media and communication platforms and the deepening of 
economic cooperation. Consequently, the enhancement of the Azerbaijani-Turkish 
partnership has been determined as one of the fundamental changes in Azerbaijan’s 
diplomacy since the Tovuz incident.  
The results of the study also determined that one of the major implications of the 
Tovuz skirmishes was the reconsideration of Baku’s stance on the resolution of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In the context of changing geopolitical circumstances in the 
region and the impasse situation in the negotiation process, the Tovuz clashes have been 
identified as a triggering event that prompted Baku to switch to harsh measures and use 
90 
 
military force in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Turkey’s unconditional 
support during the conflict and the neutral stance of Russia also created an opportunity 
for Baku to liberate the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.  
Although the military cooperation between Baku and Ankara has intensified after 
the clashes and there have been some tensions in Baku-Moscow relations, the results of 
interviews demonstrated that Azerbaijan’s security strategy did not fundamentally 
change. Azerbaijan did not make a pivot in the security strategy in the direction of the 
explicit confrontation (balancing strategy) with Moscow, but rather made short-term 
tactical maneuvers to demonstrate its discontent with Russia’s policies. There are a lot of 
analogous situations in Azerbaijan’s modern history when such measures have been 
employed in foreign relations. Azerbaijani elites proceeded with hedging strategy with 
respect to regional powers. Azerbaijan’s attempts to influence Moscow’s policies through 
the communication channels and media reflect the binding engagement element of 
Azerbaijan’s hedging strategy. The deepening of military cooperation with Ankara is a 
part of the limited balancing component of Azerbaijan’s hedging strategy. The increased 
engagement of Turkey in regional affairs and the mutual political support between Ankara 
and Baku reflect the dominance denial element of Azerbaijan’s hedging policy. Thus, 
Azerbaijan continued following the balanced approach in its relations with regional 
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Appendix 1. List of interviewees 
Dr. Anar Veliyev (Dean and Associate Professor of School of Public and International 
Affairs, ADA University). December 8, 2020. Skype.  
Farhad Mammadov (Valdai Club Expert; Former state serviceman at President 
Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan; Former Director at the Center for Strategic 
Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan). December 9, 2020. Skype. 
Dr. Farid Shafiyev (Chairman of the Center for Analysis of International Relations (AIR 
Center); Former Ambassador of Azerbaijan to Canada; Former Ambassador of 
Azerbaijan to the Czech Republic). December 9, 2020. Skype.  
Dr. Fariz Ismailzade (Executive Vice Rector of ADA University, Board member of 
Amcham Azerbaijan). December 10, 2020. Skype. 
Dr. Vasif Huseynov (Senior Research Fellow at the AIR Center). December 24, 2020. 
Skype. 















Appendix 2. Interview questions 
1) How do you evaluate Azerbaijan's security strategy towards major regional and global 
powers right before Tovuz clashes? 
2) Tovuz incident was the first clash of such a large scale directly on the Azerbaijani-
Armenian border since the first Karabakh war. Taking into account the crucial strategic 
importance of the Tovuz region, how did Azerbaijan react to the threats to its security? 
3) Do you think Azerbaijan has changed its diplomacy towards major regional and global 
powers immediately after the Tovuz clashes? 
4) There was massive transportation of military equipment from Russia to Armenia 
during clashes and these issues were brought by the President of Azerbaijan to a serious 
discussion with Vladimir Putin. Despite, Shoigu’s statement that it was construction 
materials delivered to Gyumri military base, Hikmat Hajiyev was not satisfied with this 
reply. Do you think there is a pivot in relations with Russian Federation?  
5) Right after the Tovuz clashes, Azerbaijan conducted joint military exercises with 
Turkey as a response to the Russo-Armenian military drills. What would you say are the 
implications of enhanced Ankara-Baku relations in general and specifically regarding 
Russia? 
